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THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: A SELFEXECUTING TREATY
Gary B. Born*
The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards—also known as the New York Convention—is the
world’s most significant legislative instrument relating to international
commercial arbitration. It currently has 159 Contracting States, including
the United States, and provides a global constitutional charter for the
international arbitral process. The Convention has enabled both national
courts and arbitral tribunals to develop durable, effective means for
enforcing international arbitration agreements and awards and has thereby
facilitated the remarkable growth and success of international arbitration
over the past 50 years.
Notwithstanding the Convention’s significance, there is surprising
uncertainty whether the Convention, or any individual provision of the
Convention, is “self-executing” under U.S. law and therefore directly
applicable in American courts without the interposition of domestic
implementing legislation. There is limited commentary in the United States
addressing these issues in any detail, and, although a number of courts have
treated the Convention as self-executing, other authorities have either
concluded to the contrary or expressed confusion as to the Convention’s
status.
The thesis of this Article is that uncertainty regarding the Convention’s
status as a self-executing treaty of the United States is unwarranted and
unfortunate. Instead, both the Convention’s provisions for recognition and
enforcement of arbitration agreements (in Article II) and of arbitral awards
(in Articles III, IV, V, and VI) should be regarded as self-executing and
directly applicable in U.S. (and other national) courts. As discussed in detail
below, this is because Article II establishes mandatory, complete, and
comprehensive substantive rules, directed specifically to national courts, for
the recognition and enforcement of international arbitration agreements.
*
Mr. Born is the author of INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (2d ed.
2014), INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS (2d ed. 2015),
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND FORUM SELECTION AGREEMENTS: DRAFTING AND
ENFORCING (5th ed. 2016), INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: LAW AND PRACTICE (2d ed.
2015), and INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS (6th ed. 2018).
Mr. Born is also Chair of the International Arbitration Practice Group at Wilmer Cutler
Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP. He has addressed various of the issues dealt with in this Article
during his practice. Kevin J. Huber and Apoorva J. Patel provided very able research
assistance for this Article, which also benefited from thoughtful comments by George
Bermann, Curtis Bradley, Charles (“Chip”) Brower II, James Carter, William Dodge,
Christopher Drahozal, Paul Dubinsky, William Park, Catherine Rogers, Bo Rutledge, Linda
Silberman, David Sloss, David Stewart, Paul Stephan, Carlos Vázquez, and Ingrid Wuerth.
All mistakes are the author’s own.
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Likewise, the history and purposes of the Convention, the language and
legislative history of Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act (the “FAA” or
“Act”), and the practices of other Contracting States support the conclusion
that Article II is directly applicable in American courts.
Similar analysis applies to Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention.
The text of these provisions, as well as their objects and purposes, also
indicate that they were intended to apply directly in American courts.
Likewise, a careful reading of Chapter 2 of the FAA and its legislative
history indicates that the Convention’s provisions dealing with arbitral
awards are self-executing and directly applicable in American courts.
It is important to the Convention’s success, particularly in the United
States, that its self-executing status be recognized. If the Convention were
not self-executing, there would be no basis for its application in U.S. state
courts, which would likely place the United States in material breach of its
international obligations under the Convention and produce highly unusual
disparities in the treaty’s application in state and federal courts. Likewise, if
the Convention were not self-executing, the application of some of its terms,
including the critical provisions of Article II, might also be inapplicable in
U.S. federal courts—again, placing the United States in violation of its
international obligations. Moreover, treating the Convention as non-selfexecuting would result in national courts—and particularly U.S. courts—
interpreting and applying disparate domestic arbitration statutes, rather than
developing a uniform, harmonized interpretation of a single international
instrument. This approach would materially undercut one of the
Convention’s fundamental objectives: the establishment of uniform rules of
international law governing the international arbitral process.
This Article examines the foregoing issues. Part I addresses the history,
provisions, and purposes of the New York Convention. Part II considers
whether the New York Convention is self-executing. This Part first analyzes
whether Article II of the Convention is self-executing, addressing the text
and purposes of Article II, the process leading to U.S. ratification of the
Convention, the position of the U.S. government, and relevant national court
decisions. It then addresses whether the Convention’s provisions concerning
awards—in Articles III, IV, V, and VI—are self-executing and concludes
that these provisions, like Article II, are directly applicable in American
courts. Finally, Part III examines the implications of the Convention’s selfexecuting status for the treaty’s role as the constitutional charter for
international commercial arbitration in the United States and elsewhere.

I. The New York Convention
The New York Convention is central to the legal regime applicable to
international arbitration agreements and awards. The Convention prescribes
mandatory, uniform international rules governing the recognition and
enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards in
Contracting States. The Convention also provides the foundation for most
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national legislation governing the international arbitral process, which in
1
turn gives effect to and elaborates upon the Convention’s basic principles.

A. History and Objectives of the New York Convention
The New York Convention was adopted to address the needs of the
international business community and to facilitate international trade and
2
commerce. In particular, the Convention aimed to improve the legal regime
provided by the Geneva Protocol on Arbitration Clauses of 1923 (the
“Geneva Protocol”) and the Geneva Convention on the Execution of
3
Foreign Arbitral Awards of 1927 (the “Geneva Convention”).
The first draft of what became the Convention was prepared in 1953 by
4
the International Chamber of Commerce (the “ICC”). The ICC observed
that “[t]he 1927 Geneva Convention . . . no longer entirely meets modern
economic requirements” and introduced its draft of an improved treaty with
the objective of establishing “a new international system of enforcement of
5
6
arbitral awards.” The ICC draft, and a subsequent draft prepared by the
United Nations Economic and Social Council, provided the basis for a
three-week conference in New York—the United Nations Conference on
Commercial Arbitration (the “New York Conference”)—attended by
7
delegates from 45 states in the Spring of 1958. The United States sent a
delegation to attend the negotiating and drafting sessions at the Conference,
8
but deliberately played a limited role in the proceedings.
1.
See generally 2 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, §
11.02, at 1535–36 (2d ed. 2014).
2.
See Robert Briner, Philosophy and Objective of the Convention, in ENFORCING
ARBITRATION AWARDS UNDER THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: EXPERIENCE AND PROSPECTS
9, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.2 (1999).
3.
See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF
1958, at 7 (1981) [hereinafter VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION].
4.
Id. The International Chamber of Commerce’s (“ICC’s”) draft focused exclusively
on the recognition of international arbitral awards. See GIORGIO GAJA, INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: THE NEW YORK CONVENTION (1978); Int’l Chamber of
Commerce, Report and Preliminary Draft Convention Adopted by the Committee on
International Commercial Arbitration at Its Meeting of 13 March 1953, reprinted in 9 ICC
INT’L CT. ARB. BULL. 32, 32 (1998) [hereinafter ICC, Report].
5.
ICC, Report, supra note 4.
6.
Id.
7.
U.N. CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, Final Act
and Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, at 3, ¶¶ 3–
4, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/8/Rev.1 (1958); History 1923 - 1958, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/travaux+preparatoires/history+1923+-+1958 (last visited
Nov. 28, 2018).
8.
Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on
International Commercial Arbitration (Aug. 15, 1958), reprinted in 19 AM. REV. INT’L ARB.
91, 95 (2008) [hereinafter Delegation Report]. At the time, the U.S. Delegation was skeptical
of the value of the proposed treaty and was largely uninvolved in negotiations. Id. at 95, 115–
18.
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The Conference ultimately produced a draft convention that came to be
referred to as the New York Convention. The new draft was in many
respects a radically innovative instrument: it created, for the first time, a
comprehensive legal regime for the international arbitral process. Earlier
drafts of the proposed treaty focused entirely on the enforcement of
arbitral awards with no provisions addressing the enforcement of
arbitration agreements. As one commentator summarizes the Convention’s
drafting history:
Originally, it was the intention to leave the provisions concerning
the formal validity of the arbitration agreement and the obligatory
referral to arbitration to a separate protocol. At the end of the New
York Conference of 1958, it was realized that this was not
desirable. Article II [which dealt with arbitration agreements,] was
drafted in a race against time, with, as a consequence, the omission
of an indication as to which arbitration agreements the Convention
9
would apply.
10

This revised approach was eventually adopted, and the resulting provisions
addressing the recognition of arbitration agreements form one of the central
elements of the Convention. The extension of the draft to encompass both
arbitration agreements and awards made the Convention the first
international instrument to comprehensively deal with all major elements of
11
the arbitral process—from arbitration agreement to arbitral award.
The New York Conference’s members approved and opened for
signature the text of the Convention on June 10, 1958 by unanimous vote
12
(with only the United States and three other states abstaining). The final
version of the Convention was set forth in English, French, Spanish,
13
Russian, and Chinese texts. The text of the Convention is only a few pages
long, with seven concisely drafted provisions (Articles I through VII)
containing the Convention’s essential terms.
Most of the remaining provisions of the Convention are of no relevance
to the treaty’s self-executing status. One exception, however, is Article XI
supra note 3, at 56.
See GEORGE HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: SUMMARY ANALYSIS OF RECORD OF UNITED NATIONS
CONFERENCE, MAY/JUNE 1958, at 21–28 (1958) [hereinafter HAIGHT, SUMMARY ANALYSIS].
11.
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1], at 100–02.
12.
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record of the
Twenty-Fourth Meeting, at 10, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.24 (Sept. 12, 1958). For a summary
of these negotiations, see Pieter Sanders, The History of the New York Convention, Address at
the Fourteenth Congress of the International Council for Commercial Arbitration (May
1998), in IMPROVING THE EFFICIENCY OF ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS AND AWARDS: 40
YEARS OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 11 (Albert Jan van den Berg ed.,
1999).
13.
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards art.
XVI, June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention].
9.
10.

VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION,
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of the Convention, which addresses the Convention’s application in federal
14
or non-unitary states, such as the United States. Article XI provides that,
where the Convention’s provisions “come within the legislative jurisdiction
of the federal authority,” then the Contracting State’s obligations will be no
15
different from those of unitary or non-federal states. If, however, the
Convention’s provisions “come within the legislative jurisdiction of
constituent states or provinces[,]” then “the federal Government shall bring
such articles with a favourable recommendation to the notice of the
appropriate authorities of constituent states or provinces at the earliest
16
possible moment[.]” As discussed below, the United States has not taken
the position that Article XI applies to it and has taken no action under
17
Article XI(b), which requires notice and a favorable recommendation to
constituent states.

B. Provisions of the New York Convention
The New York Convention’s provisions focus principally on
establishing uniform international standards for the recognition of
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards. As the U.S. Supreme Court
subsequently observed, the Convention was designed to “encourage the
recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory
18
countries.” Although these observations are accurate, it is clear that the
Convention also indirectly governs the arbitral process by requiring courts
of Contracting States to recognize arbitration agreements—including their
procedural terms—and to refuse to recognize awards if the parties’ agreed
19
arbitral procedures have not been followed.
Thus, the Convention’s provisions, taken together, prescribe binding
international legal rules governing the entire arbitral process, including the
recognition of arbitration agreements, the conduct of the arbitration itself,

14.
Christopher R. Drahozal, The New York Convention and the American Federal
System, 2012 J. DISP. RESOL. 101, 107–08 (2012) [hereinafter Drahozal, Convention]; see also
Robert B. Looper, ‘Federal-State’ Clauses in Multi-Lateral Instruments, 32 BRIT. Y.B. INT’L
L. 162 (1957).
15.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. XI(a).
16.
Id. art. XI(b).
17.
Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 108. The U.S. position regarding Article
XI varies. See id. (noting that a later official description of Article XI was “very different”).
At no time, however, has the United States taken the position that it may invoke Article XI(b).
NICHOLAS DEB KATZENBACH, LETTER OF SUBMITTAL, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 90-118, at 22 (2d
Sess. 1968) [hereinafter KATZENBACH, LETTER].
18.
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974); see also Smith/Enron
Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d 88, 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (noting
“the goal of simplifying and unifying international arbitration law.”).
19.
See 2 BORN, supra note 1, § 11.03[C][1][c][ii], at 1549–50.
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20

and the recognition of awards. These provisions, which are summarized
below, have provided the basis for the development of a comprehensive,
effective, and efficient legal regime for the international arbitration process.

1. Article II: Presumptive Validity of Arbitration Agreements
Central to the Convention is Article II(1), which establishes a basic,
internationally-uniform rule of formal and substantive validity for
arbitration agreements falling within the Convention’s scope. Article II(1)
provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
21
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
Article II(3) elaborates on this basic rule and adds an enforcement
mechanism, requiring the courts of Contracting States, when seized of a
matter subject to arbitration, to refer the parties to arbitration unless their
arbitration agreement is “null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
22
performed.” Article II(3) ensures that international arbitration agreements
will, consistent with their basic objectives, be promptly and efficiently
enforced in accordance with their terms by requiring the parties to arbitrate,
23
rather than litigate, their underlying dispute.
By virtue of Article II, international arbitration agreements are
presumptively valid and enforceable, subject only to specifically defined
international exceptions identified in Articles II(1) and II(3). The party
opposing recognition of the agreement must prove the applicability of these
24
exceptions. Under the Convention, Contracting States may not fashion
additional, domestic grounds for denying recognition of agreements to
arbitrate: as one appellate court explained, “[d]omestic defenses to
arbitration are transferable to [the challenge to an arbitration agreement

20.
See 1 id. § 1.04[A][1][c], at 105–12.
21.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 1.
22.
Id. art. II, ¶ 3.
23.
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][i], at 108–10; see also Gerald Aksen,
American Arbitration Accession Arrives in the Age of Aquarius: United States Implements
United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,
3 SW. U. L. REV. 1, 1 (1971) [hereinafter Aksen, American Arbitration Accession] (“[A]
Treaty whereby international arbitration agreements and awards will be specifically, speedily,
and uniformly enforceable in federal courts.”).
24.
See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.04[B][4], at 749–50. In addition, Article II(1)
provides for a non-arbitrability exception, allowing Contracting States to deny enforcement of
arbitration agreements in matters “not capable of settlement by arbitration.” See 1 BORN,
supra note 1, § 6.02[A], at 946–47.
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under the Convention] only if they fit within the limited scope of defenses”
25
permitted by Article II.
Importantly, the Convention prescribes international choice-of-law
rules that govern the selection of the law applicable to international
arbitration agreements. These choice-of-law rules—set forth in Article
V(1)(a) and impliedly in Article II—are one of the Convention’s crowning
26
achievements. The Convention’s choice-of-law rules require Contracting
States to give effect to the parties’ choice of law governing their agreement
to arbitrate, and, in the absence of any express or implied choice by the
parties, to apply the law of the arbitral seat, providing essential clarity with
27
regard to the law applicable to the parties’ arbitration agreement.
The Convention is also interpreted as imposing limits on the grounds of
substantive invalidity that can be asserted against international arbitration
28
agreements. In particular, courts and commentators have concluded that
Article II(3) requires—as a mandatory international rule—the recognition of
international arbitration agreements except where such agreements are

25.
Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1302 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Suazo v.
NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 547 (11th Cir. 2016); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co.,
675 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2012) (“ ‘[The Convention] expressly compels the federal
courts to enforce arbitration agreements,’ notwithstanding jurisdiction conferred on such
courts to adjudicate Seaman’s Wage Act claims.”) (quoting Rogers v. Royal Caribbean Cruise
Line, 547 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2008)); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d
270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2002); Simon v. Princess Cruise Lines, Ltd., No. G-13-0444, 2014 WL
12617820, at *3 (S.D. Tex. May 19, 2014); Greenberg v. Park Indem. Ltd., No. LA CV1210756 JAK (AJWx), 2013 WL 12123695, at *7–8 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2013).
26.
See 3 BORN, supra note 1, § 26.05[C][1][e][i], at 3462 (citing authorities). Article
II does not itself expressly address the choice-of-law governing international arbitration
agreements. It does, however, require Contracting States to recognize all material terms of
such agreements, including the parties’ express and implied choice-of-law. Id. The better view
is also that Article II impliedly incorporates Article V(1)(a)’s similar choice-of-law rule. Id.
27.
See New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1(a); id., art. II. Moreover, the
better view is that the Convention also requires application of a validation principle reflecting
the parties’ implied intentions to give effect to the parties’ arbitration agreement. See 1 BORN,
supra note 1, § 4.04[A][3], at 542–49.
28.
See, e.g., Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 372–73; Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302; Rhone
Mediterranee Compagnia Francese di Assicurazioni e Riassicurazoni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50,
53–54 (3d Cir. 1983); Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982);
Alghanim v. Alghanim, 828 F. Supp. 2d 636, 658 (S.D.N.Y. 2011); Matthews v. Princess
Cruise Lines, Ltd., 728 F. Supp. 2d 1326, 1329–31 (S.D. Fla. 2010); Hodgson v. Royal
Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 706 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (noting that Article II
permits non-recognition only for fraud “that can be applied neutrally on an international
scale.”) (quoting Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302); Apple & Eve, LLC v. Yantai N. Andre Juice
Co., 499 F. Supp. 2d 245, 248–49 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 610 F. Supp.
2d 226 (E.D.N.Y. 2009); Khan v. Parsons Glob. Servs., Ltd., 480 F. Supp. 2d 327, 339–40
(D.D.C. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, 521 F.3d 421 (D.C. Cir. 2008); Prograph Int’l Inc. v.
Barhydt, 928 F. Supp. 983, 989 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Technetronics, Inc. v. Leybold-Geaeus
GmbH, No. CIV. A. 93-1254, 1993 WL 197028, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 9, 1993) (declining to
declare agreement null and void absent evidence of the “traditionally recognized international
defenses such as fraud, duress or mistake.”).
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invalid under ordinary, generally-applicable principles of contract law (that
is, when such agreements are “null and void, inoperative or incapable of
being performed”). These limits effectuate the Convention’s objective by
ensuring that Contracting States recognize the validity of international
29
arbitration agreements in accordance with uniform international standards.
Under these standards, a Contracting State may not avoid its obligation
to recognize international arbitration agreements by adopting rules of
national law that single out such agreements for invalidity. Thus, national
law provisions that impose unusual notice requirements (e.g., particular
font), consent requirements (e.g., that arbitration agreements be specifically
approved or established by heightened proof requirements), procedural
requirements (e.g., only institutional arbitration agreements are valid), or
invalidity rules (e.g., arbitration agreements applicable to future disputes,
fraud claims, or tort claims are invalid) are all impermissible under Article
30
II(3). As one U.S. appellate court emphasized, “[t]he limited scope of the
Convention’s null and void clause ‘must be interpreted to encompass only
those situations—such as fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver—that can be
31
applied neutrally on an international scale.’” Other authorities adopt the
32
same analysis of the Convention, either expressly or impliedly.
Article II applies to, and requires recognition of, all material terms of
international arbitration agreements. This includes the recognition of
provisions regarding the choice of the arbitral seat, the selection of

29.
See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.06[B][1][a], at 838–41, § 5.02[D][1]–[3], [5], at
719–22; see also Rhone Mediterranee, 712 F.2d at 53; Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme
court for judicial matters] 1e civ., Nov. 21, 2006, Appeals No. 05-21.818, Bull. civ. I, No. 502
(Fr.); Dyna-Jet Pte Ltd. v. Wilson Taylor Asia Pac. Pte Ltd., [2016] SGHC 238 (Sing.).
30.
See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.06[B][1][a], at 839.
31.
Bautista, 396 F.3d at 1302 (quoting DiMercurio v. Sphere Drake Ins., 202 F.3d 71,
80 (1st Cir. 2000)).
32.
See Aggarao, 675 F.3d at 372–73; Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257,
1278 (11th Cir. 2011) (refusing to recognize “a new public policy defense under Article II—
based on the elimination of a U.S. statutory claim under the Seaman’s Wage Act—[which] by
definition could not be applied neutrally on an international scale, as each nation operates
under different statutory laws and pursues different policy concerns.” (internal quotation
omitted)); Authenment v. Ingram Barge Co., 878 F. Supp. 2d 672, 684–85 (E.D. La. 2012)
(“[P]ublic policy defenses in Convention cases must be brought at the ‘award-enforcement
stage’ rather than at the ‘arbitration-enforcement stage.’”); Lazarus v. Princess Cruise Lines,
Ltd., No. 1:11-cv-22665-KMM, 2011 WL 6070294, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 6, 2011); Hodgson
v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., No. 11-21046-CIV., 2011 WL 5005307, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 19, 2011) (“[A]n arbitration clause is null and void only if the arbitration agreement has
been obtained through fraud, mistake, duress, and waiver.” (citation omitted)); W. Tankers
Inc. v. Ras Riunione Adriatica di Sicurta SpA, [2005] EWHC (Comm) 454 [56–57] (Eng.);
Sun Life Assurance Co. v. CX Reins., [2003] EWCA (Civ) 283 [2, 55] (Eng.); Westacre Inv.,
Inc. v. Jugoimport-SDPR Holding Co., [1998] 3 WLR 770 [785–86], [2000] QB 288 (Eng.)
(identifying examples where an arbitration agreement might be invalid, “such as fraud . . . ,
the effect of the statute rendering the underlying contract illegal, the absence of consensus ad
idem, non est factum, mistake as to the person making the contract, and contracts adhesion in
which the arbitrator is, in practice, the choice of the dominant party”).
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institutional rules, the choice of arbitrators, and arbitral procedures.
Consequently, courts in Contracting States must enforce not just the parties’
exchange of commitments to arbitrate, but also give effect to the material
terms of that agreement to arbitrate, pursuant to Article II’s internationally
34
neutral standards. The overwhelming weight of national court authority is
35
consistent with this analysis.

2. Articles III, IV, and V: Presumptive Validity of Arbitral Awards
Equally central to the New York Convention are Articles III, IV, and V,
which establish a basic international rule of validity and enforceability of
foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards falling within the scope of the
36
Convention. These obligations apply only to “foreign” awards—those
made outside the Contracting State where the party seeks recognition of the
award—and “non-domestic” awards—a category of awards with limited
37
relevance in contemporary practice. For these two types of awards, Article
III provides that “[e]ach Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as
binding” and shall enforce such awards in accordance with the Convention
38
and the recognition forum’s national procedural rules. In turn, Article IV
prescribes streamlined procedures for the proof of foreign and non-domestic
awards by the award-creditor, requiring only the presentation of translated
39
copies of the award and underlying arbitration agreement. As with Article

33.
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 5.01[B][2], at 641.
34.
See id., § 8.02[A][1], at 1255–56.
35.
See, e.g., Salt Lake Tribune Publ’g Co. v. Mgmt. Planning, Inc., 390 F.3d 684, 690
(10th Cir. 2004) (“Parties need not establish quasi-judicial proceedings resolving their
disputes to gain the protections of the FAA, but may choose from a broad range of procedures
and tailor arbitration to suit their peculiar circumstances.”); Sec. Ins. v. TIG Ins., 360 F.3d
322, 325 (2d Cir. 2004) (“FAA requires ‘arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in
[the parties’] agreement.’”) (emphasis and alteration in original) (quoting Volt Info. Scis.,
Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989)); Baravati v. Josephthal, Lyon & Ross, Inc., 28
F.3d 704, 709 (7th Cir. 1994); Lufuno Mphaphuli & Assocs. (Pty) Ltd. v. Andrews 2009 (4)
SA 529 (CC) at 102 para. 217 (S. Afr.) (“[T]he identity of the arbitrator and the manner of the
proceedings will ordinarily be determined by agreement between the parties.”); Bundesgericht
[BGer][Federal Supreme Court] Mar. 12, 2003, DECISIONI DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE
SVIZZERO [DTF] 4P.2/2003 I 3 (Switz.); Austria No. 10 of 1992, 22 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 619,
625 (Austrian Sup. Ct.).
36.
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c], at 108–12. But cf. 3 BORN, supra note 1, §
26.06[A], at 3719 (noting that Article VI of the Convention provides a limited exception to
the obligation of courts of Contracting States to recognize foreign arbitral awards, allowing
courts in the recognition forum to stay or suspend recognition proceedings if an application to
annul the award has been filed in the arbitral seat).
37.
2 id. § 22.02[E][1][a], at 2942. Non-domestic awards are awards made in the state
where recognition is sought, but which are not regarded as “domestic” awards by that state. In
practice, very few Contracting States treat any awards made in their territory as non-domestic.
Id.
38.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III.
39.
Id. art. IV.
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II(3) and arbitration agreements, the purpose of Article IV is to ensure the
speedy and efficient recognition of arbitral awards, giving effect to the
parties’ underlying objectives in agreeing to finally resolve their disputes by
40
arbitration.
Finally, Article V provides that “[r]ecognition and enforcement of the
award may be refused . . . only if” one of seven specified exceptions, set
41
forth in Articles V(1) and V(2), applies. The Convention’s exceptions are
limited to issues of jurisdiction (Articles V(1)(a) and V(1)(c)); procedural
regularity and fundamental fairness (Article V(1)(b)); compliance with the
procedural terms of the parties’ arbitration agreement or, absent such
agreement, the procedural requirements of the arbitral seat (Article V(1)(d));
and public policy or non-arbitrability (Articles V(2)(a) and V(2)(b)). An
award may also be denied recognition if a competent court in the arbitral
seat annuls the award (Article V(1)(e)). Notably, these exceptions do not
permit review by a recognition court of the merits of the arbitrators’
42
substantive decisions resolving the parties’ dispute.
As with Article II, the provisions of Articles III, IV, and V are
mandatory, not permissive—a conclusion that national courts and other
43
authorities have uniformly confirmed. It is also clear that the exceptions
set forth in Article V are exclusive: courts in Contracting States may not
deny recognition of foreign or non-domestic awards except on one of the
44
grounds listed in Article V. Moreover, consistent with the Convention’s
40.
See id. art. IV; 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][ii], at 110 (“Article IV
prescribes streamlined procedures . . . .”); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession, supra note
23, at 1 (prefacing that, under the Convention, “international arbitration agreements and
awards will be specifically, speedily, and uniformly enforceable in federal courts.”).
41.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V.
42.
See generally 3 BORN, supra note 1, §26.05[C][12], at 3707–12.
43.
See, e.g., Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“[A] district court[] . . . must confirm the award unless one of the grounds for
refusal specified in the Convention applies to the underlying award.”) (citation omitted);
Rosseel N.V. v. Oriental Com. & Shipping Co. [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 625 (Comm) at 628
(Eng.) (“If none of the grounds for refusal are present, the award ‘shall’ be enforced.”);
Cayman Islands No. 2 of 1989, 15 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 436, 439 (Gambon Grand Ct.); see also
Jan Paulsson, The New York Convention in International Practice – Problems of Assimilation,
in THE NEW YORK CONVENTION OF 1958, at 100, 105 (Marc Blessing ed., ASA Special
Series No. 9, 1996) (emphasis in original) (“The Convention imposes a clear obligation on
member States to enforce awards, if various conditions [set forth in Article IV] are
fulfilled. . . . If the conditions are fulfilled, the award must be enforced unless one of the
grounds for refusal of enforcement [set forth in Article V] exists.”).
44.
See, e.g., Encyc. Universalis S.A. v. Encyc. Britannica, Inc., 403 F.3d 85, 92 (2d
Cir. 2005) (“[A] district court is strictly limited to the seven defenses under the New York
Convention when considering whether to confirm a foreign award.”) (citations omitted);
Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 364 F.3d 274,
288 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[C]ourts in countries of secondary jurisdiction may refuse enforcement
only on the grounds specified in Article V.”); Dallah Real Estate & Tourism Holding Co. v.
Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Gov’t [2010] UKSC 46 [101], [2010] 3 WLR 1472
[1510] (Eng.) (“[Article V] grounds are exhaustive.”); Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal

Fall 2018]

The New York Convention

125

pro-enforcement objective, the burden of proof for resisting recognition and
enforcement of an award under Article V is on the award-debtor, not the
award-creditor, and national courts have emphasized that Article V’s
45
exceptions must be strictly construed.

3. Articles II and V(1)(d): Recognition of Parties’ Procedural Autonomy
The Convention also addresses, at least indirectly, the procedures used
in international arbitrations. In particular, Articles II and V(1)(d) of the
Convention both provide for recognition of the parties’ agreed arbitral
46
procedures.
As noted above, Articles II(1) and II(3) require Contracting States to
recognize all of the material terms of agreements to arbitrate and to refer the
47
parties to arbitration in accordance with those terms. Those provisions
obligate courts in Contracting States to give effect to the arbitral procedures
48
that the parties provide for in their arbitration agreements. The Convention
impliedly permits Contracting States to deny effect to such agreements in
limited, exceptional circumstances in order to protect the integrity of the
arbitral process, but it does not otherwise limit the parties’ procedural
49
autonomy.
Article V(1)(d) similarly provides for non-recognition of awards where
the “composition of the arbitral authority or the arbitral procedure was not
in accordance with the agreement of the parties, or, failing such agreement,
was not in accordance with the law of the country where the arbitration took
50
place[.]” Even more explicitly than Article II, Article V(1)(d) gives
priority to the parties’ agreement regarding arbitral procedures, providing
for application of the law of the arbitral seat only as a default mechanism

Supreme Court] July 28, 2010, DECISIONI DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE SVIZZERO [DTF]
4A_233/2010 (Switz.); Belgium No. 10 of 1997, 22 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 643, 647 (Belg. App.
Ct.).
45.
See, e.g., Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d 832, 836 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“Convention defenses are interpreted narrowly.”) (citations omitted); Ario v. Underwriting
Members of Syndicate 53 at Lloyds for 1998 Year of Account, 618 F.3d 277, 291 (3d Cir.
2010) (“[C]ourts have strictly applied the Article V defenses and generally view[ed] them
narrowly.”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Admart AG, 457 F.3d at 308); China
Minmetals Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 283 (3d Cir. 2003)
(noting that courts have “construed those exceptions narrowly.”) (citations omitted); Int’l
Trading & Indus. Inv. Co. v. DynCorp Aerospace Tech., 763 F. Supp. 2d 12, 28 (D.D.C.
2011) (“[A] narrow reading of the New York Convention comports with the context in which
the Convention was enacted . . . .”) (citation omitted); AO Techsnabexport v. Globe Nuclear
Servs. & Supply, Ltd., 656 F. Supp. 2d 550, 554 (D. Md. 2009); FG Hemisphere Assoc. LLC
v. Dem. Rep. Congo, [2008] H.K.C.F.I. 906 (C.F.I.) (H.K.).
46.
See 2 BORN, supra note 1, § 15.02[A], at 2131–32.
47.
See supra Part I.B.1.
48.
See 1 BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][iii], at 112.
49.
Id.
50.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1(d).
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when the parties have not made any agreement regarding procedural
51
matters. Together, these provisions ensure that one of the central
objectives of the arbitral process—facilitating the parties’ procedural
52
autonomy—is realized.

** * ****
In sum, the various provisions of the Convention made a number of
significant improvements to the Geneva Protocol and Geneva Convention.
Among other things, the Convention shifted the burden of proving the
validity or invalidity of awards from the award-creditor to the award-debtor
and mandated summary, expedited recognition procedures; recognized
substantial
party
autonomy
with
respect
to
the
arbitral
procedures; prescribed choice-of-law rules for the law applicable to
arbitration agreements and required their specific enforcement; and
abolished the previous “double exequatur” requirement (which had required
that awards be confirmed in the arbitral seat before being recognized
53
abroad). The President of the New York Conference summarized the
Convention’s improvements as follows:
[I]t was already apparent that the [Convention] represented an
improvement on the Geneva Convention of 1927. It gave a wider
definition of the awards to which the Convention applied; it
reduced and simplified the requirements with which the party
seeking recognition or enforcement of an award would have to
comply; it placed the burden of proof on the party against whom
recognition or enforcement was invoked; it gave the parties greater
freedom in the choice of the arbitral authority and of the arbitration
procedure; it gave the authority before which the award was sought
to be relied upon the right to order the party opposing the
54
enforcement to give suitable security.
The Convention’s provisions establish a robust legal framework for the
international arbitral process. Consistent with the Convention’s objectives,
national courts have held that these provisions mandate a uniform, “proenforcement” regime that allows effective, efficient recognition and
enforcement of both international arbitration agreements and awards. As
one U.S. appellate court declared, “The purpose of the New York
Convention . . . is to ‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of

51.
At the same time, Article V(1)(b) of the Convention also permits non-recognition
of awards where a party was denied an opportunity to present its case, imposing a requirement
of procedural fairness on the arbitral process. BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c][iii], at 112.
52.
See id.
53.
Id. § 1.04[A][1], at 102.
54.
U.N. Conference on International Commercial Arbitration, Summary Record of the
Twenty-Fifth Meeting, at 2, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.25 (Sept. 12, 1958).
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commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify
the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral
55
awards are enforced in the signatory countries.’” Other courts and
commentators have adopted similar interpretations of the Convention’s
56
“pro-enforcement” objectives with respect to both arbitration agreements
57
and arbitral awards. In particular, despite the United States’ initial
reluctance to ratify the Convention, U.S. courts have played a leading role
in interpreting the Convention and ensuring the efficacy and efficiency of
the international arbitral process, with foreign courts frequently relying on
58
U.S. decisions.
59
The Convention has been highly successful in achieving its objectives.
The use of arbitration to resolve international commercial disputes increased
55.
Int’l Ins. v. Caja Nacional De Ahorro y Seguro, 293 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)).
56.
See, e.g., Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15; Repub. of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp., 638
F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2011) (federal policy favoring arbitration “is even stronger in the
context of international business transactions”); Polimaster Ltd. v. RAE Sys., Inc., 623 F.3d
832, 841 (9th Cir. 2010) (“New York Convention was enacted to promote the enforceability
of international arbitration agreements”); Société Bomar Oil N.V v. E.T.A.P, 1987 REV. ARB.
482, 485–86 (Ct. App. Paris 1987) (“facilitate dispute resolution by way of international
commercial arbitration”); Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] September 30,
2010, 2011 NEUE JURISTISCHE WOCHENSCHRIFT RECHTSPRECHUNGS-REPORT [NJW-RR]
569 (570) (Ger.) (“With the New York Convention, the enforcement of arbitration agreements
should be facilitated internationally.”); Switzerland No. 8, 1986 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 532, 535
(“The purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the resolution of disputes through
arbitration”); IMC Aviation Sols Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] VSCA 248, ¶ 45, n.16
(Austl.) (“Convention is widely recognised in international arbitration circles as having a ‘proenforcement’ policy”).
57.
See, e.g., Admart AG v. Stephen & Mary Birch Found., Inc., 457 F.3d 302, 307 (3d
Cir. 2006) (“policy of favoring enforcement of foreign arbitral awards”); Bergesen v. Joseph
Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983) (purpose of Convention is “to encourage the
recognition and enforcement of international arbitration awards.”) (citation omitted); Parsons
& Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de l’Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 F.2d
969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974) (Convention’s “basic thrust was to liberalize procedures for enforcing
foreign arbitral awards . . . .”); Dowans Holdings SA v. Tanzania Elec. Supply Co. [2011]
EWHC (Comm) 1957 [10] (Eng.) (“intention of the New York Convention was to make
enforcement of a Convention award more straightforward”); Bharat Aluminium v. Kaiser
Aluminium, (2010) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 149 (India) (“The underlying motivation of the New York
Convention was to reduce the hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and speedy system for
enforcement of foreign arbitral award.”); Italy No. 104, 1988 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 498, 499
(“New York Convention clearly aimed at making the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
easier”); Singapore No. 1, 1995 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 771, 779 (“principle of comity of nations
requires that the awards of foreign arbitration tribunals be given due deference and be
enforced unless exceptional circumstances exist”).
58.
A number of U.S. decisions under the Convention have been influential in non-U.S.
courts, including Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614
(1985); Scherk, 417 U.S. 506; Parsons & Whittemore, 508 F.2d 969; see BORN, supra note 1,
§ 2.03[B][1][b][i], at 299–300; id. § 5.01[C][2], at 644–46.
59.
Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 657 (Can.) (“great
success”); see BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][b], at 103; Michael John Mustill, Arbitration:
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60

dramatically over the past fifty years, with observers describing arbitration
61
as the predominant means of resolving international commercial disputes.
The Convention has been central to these developments, providing the
foundation for contemporary international commercial arbitration and one
of the pillars of today’s broader international legal system.

C. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention 62
Following the adoption of the Convention in 1958, the U.S. delegation
to the New York Conference initially recommended against U.S. ratification
of the treaty, asserting that this was necessary to avoid potential conflicts
63
between the Convention and existing U.S. law. That recommendation was
followed for the next decade, with the United States taking no steps to ratify
the Convention, notwithstanding the accessions of a number of other major
64
trading states.
The position of the United States “changed as the nation’s transnational
65
commerce increased.” On June 10, 1968, exactly ten years after the

History and Background, 6 J. INT’L ARB. 43, 49 (1989) (The Convention “has been the “most
effective instance of international legislation in the entire history of commercial law.”); J.
Gillis Wetter, The Present Status of the International Court of Arbitration of the ICC: An
Appraisal, 1 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 91, 93 (1990) (“single most important pillar on which the
edifice of international arbitration rests”).
60.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.03, at 94; TOWARD A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH, 341 app. 1 (Christopher R. Drahozal &
Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005).
61.
See France No. 35, 2005 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 499, 502 (Ct. App. Paris) (“usual
means”); Messrs. Eckhardt & Co. v. Mohammad Hanif, (1993) 1 PLD (SC) 42, 52 (Pak.)
(“very common nowadays”); Pierre Lalive, Transnational (or Truly International) Public
Policy and International Arbitration, in COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC
POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) (“ ‘the’ ordinary and normal
method”) (emphasis in original).
62.
For commentary on the U.S. ratification of the Convention, see Leonard V.
Quigley, Acceuission by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049 (1961)
[hereinafter Quigley, Accession by the United States]; see also Aksen, American Arbitration
Accession, supra note 23; Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 102–04.
63.
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1 (1970) (“Although the United States participated
in the [New York] [C]onference, the convention was not signed on behalf of our government
at that time because the American delegation felt that certain provisions were in conflict with
some of our domestic laws.”).
64.
Between 1958 and 1968, 33 states acceded to the Convention, including France,
Germany, and Switzerland. Contracting States, N.Y. ARB. CONVENTION,
http://www.newyorkconvention.org/countries (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
65.
Louis Del Duca & Nancy A. Welsh, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration
Agreements and Awards: Application of the New York Convention in the United States, 62
AM. J. COMP. L. 69, 70 (2014); see also S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10, at 5, 7 (2d Sess. 1968)
(statement of Richard D. Kearney) [hereinafter 1968 Kearney Statement] (“Our failure to
become a party to the convention has resulted in difficulties for American businessmen
seeking to enforce arbitral awards against parties located in foreign countries” and that he was
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Convention was opened for signature, President Johnson signed the
66
Convention and submitted it to the Senate for advice and consent. U.S.
international businesses and the legal profession strongly supported U.S.
ratification, emphasizing the importance of international arbitration to cross67
border trade and investment. Virtually no opposition was recorded to the
Convention, including from the Department of State, which previously
68
opposed U.S. accession. As discussed below, in addition to supporting
ratification of the Convention, the Departments of State and Justice also
recommended federal implementing legislation to ensure effective
69
application of the Convention in U.S. courts.
After receiving the Senate’s consent—by a vote of 57-0 —President
70
Nixon ratified the Convention in 1970. At the same time, Congress
enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA, which added eight sections to the Act
addressing various procedural aspects of the Convention’s application in
71
U.S. federal courts. The new provisions of Chapter 2 included sections on
federal subject matter jurisdiction, venue, removal, injunctive authority, and
72
similar ancillary matters. Chapter 2 supplemented the original FAA,
enacted in 1925, which addressed, in a skeletal and relatively archaic
fashion, the enforcement of domestic and some international arbitration
73
agreements and awards. After the enactment of Chapter 2 of the FAA, the
instrument of the accession of the United States to the Convention was filed
not aware of “any indication that any segment of the community is opposed to this
convention”).
66.
114 CONG. REC. 10487–88 (1968) (message of President Johnson).
67.
H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 2 (1970) (House Judiciary Committee reporting receipt
of “a number of communications from lawyers and businessmen urging early and favorable
action on [the Senate bill to enact Chapter 2 of the FAA], and so far as is known, there is no
opposition to the bill. It has the support of the American Bar Association, the Association of
the Bar of the City of New York, the American Arbitration Association, the Inter-American
Commercial Arbitration Association, the International Chamber of Commerce, Office and
Professional Employees International Union, the Department of State, the Department of
Justice, and the Bureau of the Budget.”).
68.
See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5 (“[T]here was no known
opposition to the convention in the business or the foreign trade community . . . . [T]he
Secretary of State should recommend to the President that the Convention be sent to the
Senate for its advice and consent.”).
69.
See infra note 139.
70.
114 CONG. REC. 29605 (1968); Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, at 2560, Dec. 11. 1970, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958).
71.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201–208 (2012); see also infra Part. II.B.3.A; Drahozal,
Convention, supra note 14, at 104, 107–11.
72.
9 U.S.C. §§ 202–203 (federal subject matter jurisdiction), 204 (venue), 205
(removal), 206 (injunctive authority) and 207 (statute of limitations) (2012).
73.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012). The domestic FAA, now contained in a retitled
“Chapter 1” of the Act, has only been amended in minor respects since 1925. See LARRY E.
EDMONSON, DOMKE ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. 4 (3d ed. 2010); Imre S. Szalai, The
Federal Arbitration Act and the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 12 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
319, 353–57 (2007).
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with the United Nations on September 30, 1970, and the Convention entered
74
into force for the United States on December 29, 1970.

II. The New York Convention Is Self-Executing
Despite the New York Convention’s importance, there is a degree of
uncertainty in the United States about whether it is self-executing and
directly applicable in national court proceedings. One U.S. appellate
decision concluded, with limited analysis, that Article II of the Convention
75
is not self-executing, and dicta of the Supreme Court in Medellín v. Texas
arguably suggests that Article V of the Convention is not self-executing
76
either. In contrast, other U.S. authorities, at both the federal and state level,
instead hold that various provisions of the Convention, and in some cases
77
the Convention itself, are self-executing. Some observers, including the
current version of the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial and Investment Arbitration (the “Restatement”), take no
78
position at all on the matter, concluding that the Convention’s status is in
79
“murky waters . . . .”
74.
U.S. Accedes to Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards, 63 DEP’T ST. BULL. 598,
598 (1970).
75.
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995).
76.
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521 (2008); see also Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
77.
See infra note 79 (citing authorities); see also Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp v. Certain
Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 587 F.3d 714, 732 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., concurring) (“I
would hold that the relevant treaty provision, Article II of the Convention, is selfexecuting . . . .”); Martin v. Certain Underwriters of Lloyd’s London, No. SACV10–1298
AG(AJWx), 2011 WL 13227729, at *5–7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 2, 2011) (holding that the relevant
provision in Article II of the Convention is self-executing). Both federal and state courts have
repeatedly applied provisions of the Convention directly, without expressly holding that the
Convention is self-executing. See, e.g., Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732,
737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A, 57 N.Y.2d 408,
414–16 (N.Y. 1982); Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980
N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531
N.Y.S.2d 547, 550–52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988); Faberge Int’l Inc. v. Di Pino, 491 N.Y.S.2d
345, 348 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985); Shah v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1985); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d
549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No.
CA2009-11-149, 2010 WL 2371991, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010).
78.
See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 12 reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (“[W]hether [Article
II(3) of the Convention] is self-executing is unresolved.”).
79.
ESAB Grp., Inc. v. Zurich Ins., 685 F.3d 376, 387–88 (4th Cir. 2012); see also
Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 116 (“relationship between the New York
Convention and state arbitration law in the United States is not at all settled.”). There is
limited commentary on the Convention’s status. See S.I. Strong, Beyond the Self-Execution
Analysis: Rationalizing Constitutional, Treaty, and Statutory Interpretation in International
Commercial Arbitration, 53 VA. J. INT’L L. 499, 514, 571 (2013) (“judicial analyses of the
self-executing nature of the New York Convention are limited and in conflict”); Angela D.
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Despite this uncertainty, the status of the Convention—as selfexecuting or non-self-executing—has substantial theoretical and practical
significance in the United States and elsewhere. If the Convention were selfexecuting, then its terms would apply directly in both U.S. federal and state
80
courts, ensuring that the United States’ commitments to recognize and
enforce international arbitration agreements and awards are fully honored
and realizing the Convention’s objective of facilitating the arbitral process.
In contrast, if the Convention were non-self-executing, then its terms would
not apply directly in either state or federal courts. As a consequence,
international arbitration agreements and awards would be subject to a
confusing array of different and uncertain legal rules in different American
81
courts, with, on any view, state law being applicable to significant
82
categories of such agreements and awards in U.S. state courts. As
discussed below, the shortcomings resulting from this approach are
illustrated by the difficulties that arise from the Restatement’s efforts to
prescribe rules of U.S. international arbitration law without treating the
83
Convention as self-executing. Finally, if the Convention is not regarded as
self-executing, then the McCarran-Ferguson Act arguably overrides Chapter
84
2 of the FAA.

Krupar, Note, The McCarran-Ferguson Act’s Intersection with Foreign Insurance
Companies, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 883 (2010); Brooke L. Myers, Note, Treaties and Federal
Question Jurisdiction: Enforcing Treaty-Based Rights in Federal Court, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
1449, 1499 (2007). Compare Conor Colasurdo, Note, Preventing Reverse-Preemption of the
United States’ Obligations Under the New York Convention, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 941,
971–75 (2013) (“Article II of the New York Convention should be treated as self-executing”),
and Douglas D. Reichert, Note, Provisional Remedies in the Context of International
Commercial Arbitration, 3 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 368 (1986) (arguing that Article II(3) of the
Convention is self-executing), with Campbell McLachlan, Are National Courts and
International Arbitral Tribunals in Two Worlds or One?, 7 J. INT’L DISP. SETTLEMENT 577,
587 (2016) (“Article II (3) . . . is not self-executing.”), David A. Rich, Deference to the “Law
of Nations”: The Intersection between the New York Convention, the Convention Act, the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, and State Anti-Insurance Arbitration Statutes, 33 T. JEFFERSON L.
REV. 81, 104–12 (2010) [hereinafter Rich, Deference] (arguing that Convention is non-selfexecuting), Alexander Kamel, Note, Cooperative Federalism: A Viable Option for
Implementing the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 102 GEO. L.J. 1821,
1833–34 (2014) (“Convention is not self-executing.”), Amber A. Ward, Note, Circumventing
the Supremacy Clause? Understanding the Constitutional Implications of the United States’
Treatment of Treaty Obligations Through an Analysis of the New York Convention, 7 SAN
DIEGO INT’L L.J. 491, 508 n.115 (2006) (“New York Convention is a non-self-executing
treaty.”).
80.
See infra Part II.B.3.a.
81.
See infra Appendix A.
82.
See infra Part II.B.3.a.
83.
See infra Part II.C.3.
84.
See authorities cited supra note 79 & infra notes 288–92. The McCarran-Ferguson
Act provides that certain state laws regulating insurance reverse-preempt inconsistent “Acts of
Congress,” but not U.S. treaties. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (2012).
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This Part argues that, despite the uncertainty currently surrounding the
issue, both Article II of the Convention, dealing with arbitration agreements,
and Articles III, IV, V, and VI, dealing with arbitral awards, are best
considered as self-executing treaty provisions, directly applicable in U.S.
and other domestic courts. That conclusion is true for both sets of provisions
for closely related reasons.

A. Self-Executing and Non-Self-Executing Treaty Provisions
As a treaty of the United States, the New York Convention is the
“supreme Law of the Land” under the Supremacy Clause of the U.S.
85
Constitution. Under the Constitution, treaties of the United States are a sui
generis category of law, with different characteristics than other types of
U.S. law. In Missouri v. Holland, the Supreme Court’s leading treatment of
the treaty power, the Court held that treaties are different from Acts of
86
Congress, with distinct legal consequences. Among other things, a treaty is
negotiated and made by the President pursuant to his authority over the
87
Nation’s foreign affairs and the Treaty Clause of Article II, rather than by
both houses of Congress under Article I’s provisions for enacting federal
88
legislation. Similarly, as the Court held in Missouri v. Holland, a treaty
may prescribe federal law regarding issues that do not otherwise fall within
89
Congress’ Article I legislative authority. And in construing a treaty, the
views of foreign courts and treaty partners have particular weight, whereas
90
these sources play no role in construing a U.S. statute.
Under long-standing U.S. authority, there is an important distinction
between “self-executing” and “non-self-executing” treaties. A self85.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
86.
See Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431–34 (1920). The Court distinguished
between Acts of Congress and treaties: “Acts of Congress are the supreme law of the land
only when made in pursuance of the Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when
made under the authority of the United States.” Id.
87.
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur . . . .”). The Treaty Clause grants the President the power to “make” treaties,
while requiring the President to obtain the “advice and consent” of the Senate in doing so. Id.
88.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7; see Ganesh Sitaraman & Ingrid Wuerth, The Normalization
of Foreign Relations Law, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1897, 1908 (2015) (“The treatymaking process
is different from the process of passing legislation.”) [hereinafter Sitaraman & Wuerth,
Normalization]; Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Treaties as Law of the Land: The Supremacy Clause
and the Judicial Enforcement of Treaties, 122 HARV. L. REV. 599, 615–16 (2008) [hereinafter
Vázquez, Treaties as Law].
89.
In Holland, the Supreme Court upheld legislation implementing a U.S. treaty
against constitutional challenge. The Court held the Treaty Clause granted constitutional
authority even where Article I did not, and that this authority was a sufficient basis for
subsequent implementing legislation. Holland, 252 U.S. at 431–34.
90.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
306 cmts. a, e reporters’ note 3 (AM. LAW INST. 2018); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 325 reporters’ note 4 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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executing treaty has direct, binding effect in U.S. courts and “operates of
91
itself without the aid of any legislative provision.” In contrast, and
92
notwithstanding the unqualified text of the Supremacy Clause, a “non-selfexecuting” treaty is not ordinarily directly applicable in U.S. courts. It must
be “executed” by Congress through implementing legislation that provides
93
the applicable rules of decision in U.S. courts. In addition, the distinction
between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties can apply to
individual provisions of treaties: within a single treaty, some provisions may
be self-executing, whereas other provisions of the same treaty are non-self94
executing. Although commentators criticize the distinction between self95
executing and non-self-executing treaties, the Supreme Court and other
96
U.S. courts uniformly continue to apply the doctrine.
As contemplated by the Supremacy Clause, a self-executing treaty has
97
many of the same effects in U.S. courts as a federal statute. Self-executing
treaties preempt inconsistent state law in the same manner as an Act of
98
Congress. Similarly, a self-executing treaty will supersede prior federal
91.
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829); see also Medellín v. Texas, 552
U.S. 491, 504–05 (2008); GARY B. BORN & PETER RUTLEDGE, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL
LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 16 (6th ed., 2018) [hereinafter BORN & RUTLEDGE,
INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION].
92.
The Supremacy Clause provides, in unqualified terms, that all “Treaties” are the
“supreme Law of the Land” without any reference to “self-executing” or “non-self-executing”
treaties. Despite this text, the Supreme Court has held since the early 19th century that only
“self-executing” treaties prescribe rules of federal law applicable in U.S. courts. See Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15; see also Carlos Manuel
Vázquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1082, 1113,
1129 (1992) [hereinafter Vázquez, Rights and Remedies]; Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra
note 88, 605–06; Tim Wu, Treaties’ Domains, 93 VA. L. REV. 571, 577–78 (2007).
93.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 514.
94.
See Lidas, Inc. v. United States, 238 F.3d 1076, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001) (“[I]t is far
from uncommon for a treaty to contain both self-executing and non-self-executing
provisions.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 884 n.35 (5th Cir.
1979); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
cmt. h (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
95.
See, e.g., Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 760, 760
(1988); Vázquez, Rights and Remedies, supra note 92, at 1113–14.
96.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 850–51 (2014); Medellín, 552 U.S.
at 504–05; United States v. M.H. Pulaski Co. (The Five Percent Disc. Cases), 243 U.S. 97,
105–06 (1917); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267–68 (1890); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194;
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 410–11, 429–30 (1886); Edye v. Roberston (The
Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598–99 (1884); Am. Ins. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S.
(1 Pet.) 511, 542 (1828).
97.
As noted above, the Supremacy Clause categorizes treaties as the supreme Law of
the Land, in terms equivalent to the Constitution and federal legislation. See supra note 85;
see also Vázquez, Treaties as Law, supra note 88, at 622.
98.
See Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47, 52 (1929) (“[T]he treaty-making power is
independent of and superior to the legislative power of the states, the meaning of treaty
provisions so construed is not restricted by any necessity of avoiding possible conflict with
state legislation and when so ascertained must prevail over inconsistent state enactments.”)
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legislation (and be superseded by subsequent federal legislation) under the
99
“last in time” rule. And like a federal statute, a self-executing treaty will
provide the basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction under the “arising
100
under” provisions of the Constitution and federal legislation. In contrast, a
non-self-executing treaty will have none of these effects unless
implemented by federal legislation; it will not preempt state law, supersede
101
federal legislation, or provide the basis for “arising under” jurisdiction.
Distinguishing between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties
involves consideration of a number of factors directed at ascertaining the
intentions of the federal political branches regarding a treaty’s status. In the
words of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States: “In assessing whether a treaty provision is self-executing, courts
consider whether the provision would have been intended or understood by
the U.S. treatymakers to be directly enforceable by the courts, in light of the
102
considerations relevant to the doctrine of self-execution.”
As with other issues of treaty (and statutory) interpretation, the
language of a treaty is central to determining whether or not it is self103
executing. Thus, the Supreme Court has held that determining whether a
(citations omitted); Amaya v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 158 F.2d 554, 556 (5th Cir. 1946) (“A
treaty lawfully entered into stands on the same footing of supremacy as does the Constitution
and Laws of the United States.”) (citation omitted).
99.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 115 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“An act of Congress and a self-executing treaty of the
United States are of equal status in United States law, and in case of inconsistency the later in
time prevails.”).
100.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority . . . .”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012) (“The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States.”); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
101.
See generally Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S. 39 (1913);
Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1952); see
also Roger P. Alford, Judicial Barriers to the Enforcement of Treaties, in SUPREME LAW OF
THE LAND?: DEBATING THE CONTEMPORARY EFFECTS OF TREATIES WITHIN THE UNITED
STATES LEGAL SYSTEM 333 (Gregory H. Fox et al. eds., 2017) [hereinafter FOX ET AL.,
SUPREME LAW].
102.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018). Some commentators suggest that,
although the intent of U.S. treatymakers is relevant and entitled to deference, the
treatymakers’ intent is not binding. See Michael D. Ramsey, A Textual Approach to Treaty
Non-Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L. REV. 1639, 1660–61 (2016); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Four
Problems with the Draft Restatement’s Treatment of Treaty Self-Execution, 2015 BYU L.
REV. 1747, 1770–74 (2016). The Restatement (Fourth) and weight of judicial authority focus,
however, on the intentions of the U.S. political branches do not give decisive weight to the
views or intentions of other states.
103.
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 497, 519 (2008) (“[W]e have held treaties to be selfexecuting when the textual provisions indicate that the President and Senate intended for the
agreement to have domestic effect.”).
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104

treaty provision is self-executing “begins with its text.” In doing so, the
Court emphasized the importance of examining whether the treaty provision
includes mandatory language, such as the terms “shall” or “must[,]” and
whether the provision constitutes “a directive to domestic courts,” as
105
distinguished from the legislative and executive branches. Relatedly, the
extent to which treaty provisions are specific and comprehensive, rather
than aspirational or partial, is also relevant to the provision’s self-executing
106
status.
In addition to treaty text, a number of other factors are relevant to
determining whether a treaty is self-executing. These factors include the
107
character of the agreement and the content of the rights that it confers;
108
statements in the U.S. ratification process;
the content of related
109
110
agreements; and the post-ratification views of the United States. There
appears to be no presumption that treaties or other U.S. international
111
agreements either are or are not self-executing. Some early authorities
112
suggested a presumption that treaties are self-executing based on the
federal political branches’ presumed desire to ensure treaty compliance by
113
the United States. More recently, however, the Supreme Court arguably
104.
Id. at 506.
105.
Id. at 508 (Article 94 of the U.N. Charter is non-self-executing because it “is not a
directive to domestic courts[,]” and “does not provide that the United States ‘shall’ or ‘must’
comply with an ICJ decision . . . .”); see also Foster, 27 U.S. at 314–15 (holding treaty
provision non-self-executing based on its text).
106.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 5.
107.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]oes it concern the
adjudication of traditional private legal rights such as rights to own property, to conduct a
business, or to obtain civil tort recovery? If so, it may well address itself to the judiciary.”);
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 110 reporters’ note 10 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 2,
2017) (“Courts also have been more likely to find self-execution when treaty provisions
address matters of individual or private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 111
reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987) (“Provisions in treaties of friendship, commerce, and
navigation . . . conferring rights on foreign nationals.”).
108.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 534 (“[W]hereas the Senate has issued declarations of
non-self-execution when ratifying some treaties, it did not do so with respect to the United
Nations Charter.”) (footnote omitted); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h (“[A]ccount must
be taken of any statement by the President in concluding the agreement or in submitting it to
the Senate for consent or to the Congress.”).
109.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 517–18.
110.
See id. at 506–07.
111.
See id. at 512–14; id. at 551–62 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (describing factors bearing
on whether a treaty is self-executing); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 3 (AM.
LAW INST. 2018). See infra notes 114 & 115.
112.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 141(1)(a), (2)(a) (1965); Ingrid Wuerth,
Self-Execution, in FOX ET AL., SUPREME LAW, supra note 101, at 148, 150–51.
113.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 reporters’ note 5; LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 201 (2d ed. 1996).
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114

rejected this view, with commentary now observing that “[t]he case law
115
has not established a presumption for or against self-execution.”
It is well-settled under U.S. law that “[w]hether [a treaty] is or is not
self-executing in the law of another state party to the agreement is not
116
controlling for the United States.” This is in part because not all nations
distinguish between self-executing and non-self-executing treaties in the
same manner that U.S. law does, making their treatment of a treaty of little
117
relevance to the status of the treaty under U.S. law. In the United
Kingdom, for example, treaties are generally non-self-executing and require
118
domestic legislation to have effect in U.K. courts. Conversely, the
Netherlands and some other civil law jurisdictions directly incorporate most
119
treaties into domestic law without parliamentary approval.
More
fundamentally, the positions of foreign states regarding a treaty’s character
are not determinative for purposes of U.S. law because the intentions of the
U.S. political branches in ratifying the treaty are regarded as decisive for a
120
treaty’s self-executing status as a matter of U.S. law.
Nonetheless, the publicly held views of other Contracting States
regarding a treaty’s meaning can provide indirect evidence of how, absent
contrary indication by the United States, the United States understands the
same treaty. In ratifying a treaty, the United States undertakes international
obligations, defined by the treaty’s terms, whose content is materially

114.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506–16.
115.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 3; see also Wuerth, Self-Execution,
in FOX ET AL., SUPREME LAW, supra note 101, at 148, 148–149; Vázquez, Treaties as Law,
supra note 88.
116.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h.
117.
See id. § 111 reporters’ note 5 (“[F]ew other states distinguish between selfexecuting and non-self-executing treaties.”).
118.
Ian Sinclair et al., Chapter 19: United Kingdom, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND
PRACTICE 733 (Duncan B. Hollis et al. eds., 2005) (“Generally speaking, in the United
Kingdom . . . no treaty is self-executing”).
119.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 548 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Jan. G. Brouwer, Chapter 14:
The Netherlands, in NATIONAL TREATY LAW AND PRACTICE 483 (Duncan B. Hollis et al.
eds., 2005); see also David Sloss, Domestic Application of Treaties, in THE OXFORD GUIDE
TO TREATIES, 386–87 (Duncan B. Hollis ed., 2012), (“[C]ourts in Germany, Poland and the
Netherlands . . . generally hold that treaty provisions designed to benefit private parties are
invokable by private parties and directly applicable by the courts”).
120.
See Medellín, 522 U.S. at 521 (“Our cases simply require courts to decide whether
a treaty’s terms reflect a determination by the President who negotiated it and the Senate that
confirmed it that the treaty has domestic effect.”); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876
(5th Cir. 1979); Robinson v. Salazar, 885 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1017 (E.D. Cal. 2012); Diggs v.
Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 111 cmt. h.
The fact that a treaty is non-self-executing (and not directly applicable) as a matter of
U.S. domestic law does not relieve the United States of its international obligations under
international law. RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310(1) (“Whether a treaty provision is selfexecuting concerns how the provision is implemented domestically and does not affect the
obligation of the United States to comply with it under international law.”).
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affected by the interpretations of those terms by foreign states and other
121
international authorities. The content of those obligations is necessarily
one of the factors that bear on the understanding and intentions of the U.S.
122
political branches regarding the self-executing character of a treaty.

B. Article II Is Self-Executing
Applying the standards outlined above for determining the selfexecuting character of U.S. treaties, there is substantial evidence that Article
II of the Convention is self-executing. That conclusion is supported by the
language, object, and purposes of Article II. It is confirmed by the terms of
Chapter 2 of the FAA, the ratification and legislative history of both the
Convention and Chapter 2, the weight of authority in U.S. state and federal
courts considering the status of Article II, and the position of the U.S.
government.

1. Text of Article II
The starting point for analysis of the Convention’s status, as the
123
Supreme Court has emphasized, is the text of Article II. That text argues
fairly clearly for self-executing status. Article II(1) provides:
Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing
under which the parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any
differences which have arisen or which may arise between them in
respect of a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not,
124
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.
Article II(3) then gives effect to Article II(1), providing:
The court of a Contracting State, when seized of an action in a
matter in respect of which the parties have made an agreement
within the meaning of this article, shall, at the request of one of the
parties, refer the parties to arbitration, unless it finds that the said
agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapable of being
125
performed.
These provisions plainly set forth binding substantive rules of international
law, requiring that international arbitration agreements “shall” be

121.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 306; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 325.
122.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 cmts. c, d, reporters’ note 4 (“[T]he nature of the
international obligations assumed by the United States informs the question whether a treaty
provision is self-executing,” although this issue is ultimately governed by U.S., not
international, law).
123.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 506 (“[I]nterpretation of a treaty, like the interpretation of a
statute, begins with its text.”).
124.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 1 (emphasis added).
125.
Id. art. II, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
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recognized and that parties to such agreements “shall” be referred to
arbitration. Consistent with this text, U.S. and other courts have uniformly
126
held that Article II imposes mandatory international rules.
The text of Article II provides weighty evidence that these provisions
are self-executing. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, the
use of mandatory terms, including “shall,” are strong indications that a
127
treaty is self-executing. These decisions rest on the premise that, where a
treaty imposes clear-cut, mandatory obligations on the United States, the
U.S. treaty-makers presumptively intend those obligations to be
immediately complied with, consistent with the text and objectives of the
Supremacy Clause. Here, Article II, as both a textual matter and as
interpreted by U.S. and foreign courts, is unequivocally mandatory.
Article II is also directed specifically to national courts rather than to
legislative or executive authorities. That is most apparent from Article
II(3)’s direction to “the court[s] of a Contracting State,” requiring those
128
courts to “refer the parties to arbitration” —an action that only a court
129
“seized of an action” can perform. Article II(1) is not materially different
in requiring “Contracting States” to “recognize” arbitration agreements.
Rather than the “recognition” being an action performed by other
governmental authorities, it is characteristically and necessarily performed
by national courts, where dispute resolution agreements are invoked and

126.
See, e.g., Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation Ministries Int’l, Ltd.,
556 F.3d 459, 469 (6th Cir. 2009) (“nothing discretionary about Article II(3)”) (quoting
McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. CEAT S.p.A., 501 F.2d 1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974)); InterGen
N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003) (“[E]nforcing arbitration clauses under the
New York Convention is an obligation, not a matter committed to district court discretion.”)
(citations omitted); Smith/Enron Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198
F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[T]he courts of a signatory to the Convention should abide by its
goal of enforcing international agreements to arbitrate disputes.”); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns
Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005); Hi-Fert Pty
Ltd v. Kiukiang Mar Carriers Inc, (1998) 86 FCR 374, 393 (Austl.) (“[c]ourt must stay the
proceedings and refer the parties to arbitration”); The Rena K [1979] QB 377, 393 (Eng.)
(“Section 1 of the Arbitration Act 1975, giving effect to [Article II(3) of the New York
Convention], compels the recognition and enforcement of convention (i.e., non-domestic)
arbitration agreements”); see also supra Part I.B.1.
127.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 508; Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 340–42 (1924)
(“shall have”; “shall receive”); Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, Ltd., 452 F.2d 798, 800–801
(2d Cir. 1971) (treaty is “absolute and mandatory[.]”).
128.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346–47 (2006) (“[W]here a treaty
provides for a particular judicial remedy, there is no issue of intruding on the constitutional
prerogatives of the States or the other federal branches. Courts must apply the remedy as a
requirement of federal law.”) (citation omitted).
129.
National legislative and executive branch officials cannot readily be characterized
as being “seized of an action.” In the United States, in particular, it is courts, not Congress or
the Executive Branch, that are seized of civil “action[s]” and can “refer” parties to arbitration.
Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 112 (noting “strong argument that at least one
provision [Article II(3)] of the Convention is self-executing.”).
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where Article II(3)’s enforcement mechanism expressly applies. Thus,
Article II’s provisions are not only mandatory but are also “directive[s] to
domestic courts,” which is regarded as powerful evidence of self-executing
131
status.
It is also significant that the provisions of Article II are complete and
comprehensive, requiring nothing further to be applied in national courts in
132
order to effectuate the Convention’s purposes. National courts can apply
these provisions directly to give effect to arbitration agreements and refer
parties to arbitration—as Article II mandates—without any need for further
133
substantive elaboration or detail. No additional substantive terms, beyond
the obligations to recognize arbitration agreements and to refer parties to
arbitration, are needed for Article II to fulfill its intended objectives.
This is confirmed by the language of arbitration statutes to implement
the Convention enacted in a number of Contracting States where treaties are
not self-executing. In all these statutes, the provisions implementing Article
II repeat virtually verbatim the text of Article II, adding nothing to the
Convention’s terms. For example, approximately 80 countries base their
arbitration legislation on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
134
Commercial Arbitration (the “UNCITRAL Model Law”). Articles 7 and 8
of the Model Law mirror Articles II(1) and II(3) of the Convention,
providing that “[a] court before which an action is brought in a matter which

130.
One commentator suggested that Article II(1) imposes a “discretionary
commitment on the part of the United States to take future legislative action.” Rich,
Deference, supra note 79, at 107. That suggestion is wrong for multiple reasons, including
because Article II(1) is plainly mandatory (“Each Contracting State shall . . . .”); because the
concept of a “discretionary commitment” is unknown in international law; and because U.S.
and other judicial authority is contrary to any such interpretation of Article II. See supra and
infra Part II.B.
131.
One commentator suggested that the Convention’s references to “Contracting
States” implies non-self-executing status. Rich, Deference, supra note 79, 106–08. That
analysis ignores the text of Article II(3) and misreads the remainder of Article II. The actions
required by Article II (and, as discussed below, Articles III, IV, V and VI, see infra Part
II.C.1) are judicial in nature and fairly clearly directed to national courts, rather than to
political branches.
132.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310 reporters’ notes 4, 5 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“courts focus on whether a treaty provision
is appropriate for direct judicial application”; courts “will consider whether the treaty
provision is sufficiently precise or obligatory to be suitable for direct application by the
judiciary”); see also British Caledonian Airways, Ltd. v. Bond, 665 F.2d 1153, 1161 (D.C.
Cir. 1981) (treaty provisions “require no legislation or administrative regulations to
implement them”) (quoting Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)).
133.
U.S. courts have routinely interpreted and directly applied Article II of the
Convention. See infra Part II.B.5.
134.
U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1985 WITH AMENDMENTS AS ADOPTED IN 2006, U.N. Sales No.
E.08.V.4 (2008) [hereinafter UNCITRAL MODEL LAW]; Status, UNCITRAL,
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.ht
ml (last visited Nov. 28, 2018).
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is the subject of an arbitration agreement shall . . . refer the parties to
DUELWUDWLRQXQOHVVLW¿QGVWKDWWKHDJUHHPHQWLVQXOODQGYRLGLQRSHUDWLYHRU
135
incapable of being performed.” These provisions, as well as cognate
136
provisions of other national arbitration statutes, confirm that Article II
requires no further text or implementation to be fully effective in
Contracting States.
As discussed below, the FAA’s terms confirm that Article II is self137
executing for similar reasons. In contrast to non-self-executing treaty
provisions whose substantive terms must be implemented by federal
legislation, nothing in Chapter 2 of the FAA repeats or restates the
substantive terms of Article II as U.S. law. In particular, there is no
provision in Chapter 2 giving effect to either Article II(1) or II(3) of the
Convention, mandating the validity of arbitration agreements and requiring
138
their enforcement by orders referring parties to arbitration. Instead, the
FAA contains only ancillary provisions regarding subject matter
jurisdiction, removal, venue, and similar procedural issues, none of which
restate or make the substantive terms of Article II applicable in American
139
courts.
The U.S. government has made this point in submissions to the
Supreme Court. In particular, the U.S. government has explained that
Articles II(1) and II(3) do not “envisage that steps beyond ratification [of
the Convention] are necessary before the Convention creates binding

135.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW art. 8, ¶ 1.
136.
Similarly, sections 6 and 9 of the English Arbitration Act, 1996 impose almost
identical obligations. The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23, § 6(1) (“In this Part an ‘arbitration
agreement’ means an agreement to submit to arbitration present or future disputes (whether
they are contractual or not).”), § 9(1) (“A party to an arbitration agreement against whom
legal proceedings are brought (whether by way of claim or counterclaim) in respect of a
matter which under the agreement is to be referred to arbitration may (upon notice to the other
parties to the proceedings) apply to the court in which the proceedings have been brought to
stay the proceedings so far as they concern that matter.”), § 9(4) (“On an application under
this section the court shall grant a stay unless satisfied that the arbitration agreement is null
and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed.”); see also Arbitration Ordinance,
(2013) Cap. 609, 7, § 20(1) (H.K.); Arbitration and Conciliation Act, No. 26 of 1996, INDIA
CODE (1996) §§ 44–45; Arbitration Act, Act No. 138 of 2003, art. 14 (Japan); Arbitration Act,
2002, ch. 10, § 8 (Sing.).
137.
See infra Part II.B.3.a.
138.
See supra Part II.B.1.
139.
See 9 U.S.C. §§ 203 (subject matter jurisdiction), 204 (venue), 205 (removal), 206
(injunctive power) (2012). The legislative history of the FAA confirms that Chapter 2 was
regarded as serving these ancillary purposes. See infra Part II.B.3.a. Testimony by the Deputy
Legal Adviser to the Department of State before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
confirmed this characterization: “The Department of Justice . . . has suggested that
implementing legislation . . . is desirable . . . to insure the coverage of the act extends to all
cases arising under the treaty and . . . to take care of related venue and jurisdictional
requirement problems.” 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6.
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obligations enforceable in domestic courts.” As that submission makes
clear, the provisions of Article II are a complete set of substantive rules,
expressly directed to national courts, regarding the enforcement of
141
international arbitration agreements by those courts. From a textual
perspective, Article II’s provisions are very close to textbook examples of
treaty obligations that are meant to have direct effect.

2. Purposes of Article II
The conclusion that Article II is self-executing is supported by the
object and purposes of both that provision and the Convention more
142
generally. These purposes are relevant to interpretation of the treaty and,
consequently, to the understanding and intentions of the United States in
143
ratifying the Convention.
As with other international treaties addressing issues of private
international law, the drafters of Article II sought to establish a single
uniform set of international legal standards, in this case for enforcing
144
arbitration agreements in the courts of Contracting States. A delegate to
the New York Conference made this point, noting that Contracting States
should not be permitted to decline enforcement of arbitration agreements
based on parochial local laws and that Article II’s provisions were thus
145
essential to the “whole purpose of the Convention.” Likewise, a leading
commentator on the Convention observed that, “[f]or the enforcement of the
arbitration agreement, the Convention contains internationally uniform
146
provisions.”
National courts consistently recognize the Convention’s purpose of
establishing internationally uniform rules for the enforcement of arbitration
agreements. In the words of one court:
[T]he Convention and its implementing federal legislation express a
clear federal interest in uniform rules by which agreements to
arbitrate will be enforced . . . . The application of parochial
rules . . . to agreements arising under the Convention would
140.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, at 9 (Aug. 26, 2010), Louisiana
Safety Ass’n of Timbermen—Self Insurers Fund v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 562 U.S.
827 (2010) (cert. denied) [hereinafter Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief].
141.
Id. at 8–9.
142.
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346 (2006); Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, art. 31, ¶ 1, May 31, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (“A treaty shall be interpreted
in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 306(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
143.
See RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 306 reporters’ note 11, § 310 reporters’ note 8.
144.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[A][1][c], at 106.
145.
HAIGHT, SUMMARY ANALYSIS, supra note 10, at 24–25; accord Scherk v. AlbertoCulver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
146.
VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 123.
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frustrate one of the primary objectives of the United States in
becoming a signatory to the Convention: securing uniform
standards by which agreements to arbitrate international disputes
147
are governed.
The Supreme Court made the same point, observing that the Convention’s
purpose was to “unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
148
observed and arbitral awards are enforced . . . .”
Similarly, as the
Canadian Supreme Court declared, “[t]he purpose of the Convention is to
facilitate the cross-border recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards by
149
establishing a single, uniform set of rules that apply world-wide.” To the
same effect, the United Nations General Assembly emphasized the
importance of “uniform interpretation and effective implementation” of the
150
Convention by Contracting States.
Relatedly, like other private international law treaties applicable in
multiple national jurisdictions, another objective of the Convention is
harmonization—the development over time of common, uniform standards
for the enforcement of international arbitration agreements and awards in
the courts of all Contracting States. The Convention’s terms inevitably leave
room for interpretation. Given the Convention’s objective of uniformity in
multiple jurisdictions, it is important that the courts of Contracting States
interpret these terms in a harmonized manner. As a leading commentator on
the Convention reasons, “[t]he significance of the New York Convention for

147.
Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s London v. Argonaut Ins., 500 F.3d 571, 579–80
(7th Cir. 2007) (emphasis on ‘primary’ in original, all other emphasis added).
148.
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 520 n.15.
149.
Yugraneft Corp. v. Rexx Mgmt. Corp., [2010] S.C.R. 649, 657 (Can.) (emphasis
added); see also Smith/Enron Cogeneration L.P. v. Smith Cogeneration Int’l, Inc., 198 F.3d
88, 96 (2d Cir. 1999) (Convention’s “goal of simplifying and unifying international arbitration
law”); I.T.A.D. Assocs., Inc. v. Podar Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); URS Corp. v.
Lebanese Co. for the Dev. & Reconstr. of Beirut Cent. Dist. SAL, 512 F.Supp.2d 199, 208 (D.
Del. 2007) (“The primary purpose of the New York Convention . . . is to efficiently
‘encourage the recognition and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to arbitrate are
observed.’”) (quoting Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974)); Gas
Auth. of India Ltd. v. Spie Capag, S.A. And Others, AIR 1994 (Del.) 75, ¶ 86 (India)
(Convention “lays down one uniform code” for the recognition of international arbitration
agreements, and “provides a common yard stick . . . [that] generat[es] confidence in the
parties, who may be unfamiliar with the diverse laws prevailing in different countries with
which they are trading . . . .”).
150.
G.A. Res. 62/65, at 1–2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/65 (Dec. 6, 2007) (“Emphasizing the
necessity for further national efforts and enhanced international cooperation to achieve
universal adherence to the Convention and its uniform interpretation and effective
implementation, with a view to fully realizing the objectives of the Convention . . . Requests
the Secretary-General to increase efforts to promote wider adherence to the Convention and
its uniform interpretation and effective implementation.”) (emphasis in original).
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international commercial arbitration makes it even more important that the
151
Convention is interpreted uniformly by the courts.”
These purposes, and the intentions of the Convention’s Contracting
States, are clearly best achieved by treating Article II as self-executing.
Doing so means that courts in the United States—and other Contracting
States that treat treaties as self-executing—will directly apply and interpret a
single international text, informed by decisions in other Contracting States,
rather than a multiplicity of individual national or sub-national legislative
instruments. This significantly enhances the likelihood that international
arbitration agreements will be subject to uniform international standards in
all Contracting States. In contrast, treating Article II as non-self-executing
would materially increase the risk that different Contracting States would
adopt different implementing legislation for the Convention or divergent
lines of judicial interpretation. This result would reduce the likelihood that
uniform international rules will be applied under the Convention—contrary
to the Convention’s basic purpose.
These intentions of the Convention’s Contracting States, reflected in the
Convention’s object and purposes, bear directly on the meaning of the
Convention and the United States’ obligations under the Convention. Just as
the text of a treaty is relevant to its status as self-executing or not, because it
152
informs the intentions of the U.S. political branches, other means of
interpretation of a treaty, including the treaty’s object and purposes, must
also be relevant to the understanding of the U.S. treaty-makers and the
treaty’s status. That conclusion is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
applications of the self-executing treaty doctrine, which include
153
consideration of the intentions of U.S. treaty counterparts.
151.
VAN DEN BERG, CONVENTION, supra note 3, at 1, 6, 54–55, 168–69, 262–63, 274,
357–58; see also Lindo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 652 F.3d 1257, 1285 (11th Cir. 2011) (“need
for uniformity in the enforcement of arbitration agreements.”); Certain Underwriters at
Lloyd’s, 500 F.3d, at 580 (“[U]niformity in determining the manner by which agreements to
arbitrate will be enforced is a critical objective of the Convention . . . .”); IMC Aviation
Solutions Pty Ltd v Altain Khuder LLC [2011] 282 ALR 717, ¶ 35 (Austl.); IPCO (Nigeria)
Ltd. v. Nigerian Nat’l Petroleum Corp. [2008] EWCA (Civ) 1157 [19] (Eng.) (“importance of
uniformity in the interpretation of international conventions”); Hebei Imp. & Exp. Corp. v.
Polytek Eng’g Co., [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 11, ¶ 28 (“When a number of states enter into a
treaty to enforce each other’s arbitral awards, it stands to reason that they would do so in the
realization that they, or some of them, will very likely have very different outlooks in regard
to internal matters. And they would hardly intend, when entering into the treaty or later when
incorporating it into their domestic law, that these differences should be allowed to operate so
as to undermine the broad uniformity which must be the obvious aim of such a treaty and the
domestic laws incorporating it.”).
152.
See supra Part II.A; Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 497, 506–07 (2008).
153.
See, e.g., Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 850–51 (2014) (citing international
commentary for the conclusion that, “[a]lthough the [Chemical Weapons] Convention is a
binding international agreement, it is ‘not self-executing.’”); United States v. Percheman, 32
U.S. 51, 88 (1833) (holding treaty self-executing after considering Spanish text, after
previously concluding that English text required treating treaty as non-self-executing: “If the
English and the Spanish parts can, without violence, be made to agree, that construction which
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Finally, the nature of the Convention and the rights it confers confirm
154
the self-executing character of Article II. As noted above, treaties
addressing commercial matters, such as friendship, navigation, and
commerce treaties and the Vienna Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods, are particularly likely to be categorized as self155
executing. That is especially true where the treaty addresses private rights
156
and obligations. Here, the Convention is a commercial treaty (focusing on
international commercial arbitration), with Article II conferring private
157
rights that arise only in national courts. These provisions are prime
examples of the types of treaty provisions that have been, and should be,
regarded as self-executing in the United States.

3. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention
In ratifying the Convention, the United States also adopted
implementing legislation, which added Chapter 2 to the original, domestic
FAA. There is nothing in the language of Chapter 2, or in the history of the
United States’ ratification of the Convention or enactment of Chapter 2, that
contradicts the conclusion that the Convention is self-executing. On the
contrary, the text and structure of the FAA, and the U.S. ratification process
more generally, provide additional support for Article II’s self-executing
status, despite customary caveats regarding the value of legislative
158
history.

establishes this conformity ought to prevail.”); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th
Cir. 1979) (citing foreign and international authority in concluding that treaty was non-selfexecuting); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (“Courts will evaluate whether the text and context of the
provision, along with other treaty materials, are consistent with an understanding by the U.S.
treatymakers that the provision would be directly enforceable in courts in the United States.”).
154.
See supra Part II.A. and note 107; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note
10.
155.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 111 reporters’ note 5 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
156.
See Medellín, 552 U.S. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Edye v. Robertson, 112 U.S.
580, 598–99 (1884); Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829) (“act[s] directly” on
property rights); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) § 310 reporters’ note 10 (“Courts also have been
more likely to find self-execution when treaty provisions address matters of individual or
private rights as opposed to the rights of the state.”); see also VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v.
Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014) (contractual rights of private party under
UN Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods).
157.
See generally BORN, supra note 1, ch. 8. The Convention permits a “commercial”
reservation that many Contracting States, including the United States, have made use of. Id.
158.
See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 568 (2005)
(“[L]egislative history is itself often murky, ambiguous, and contradictory. . . . [J]udicial
reliance on legislative materials like committee reports . . . may give unrepresentative
committee members—or, worse yet, unelected staffers and lobbyists—both the power and the
incentive to attempt strategic manipulations of legal history to secure results they were unable
to achieve through the statutory text.”).
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a. Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act
Some authorities have concluded, with little analysis, that the enactment
of Chapter 2 of the FAA implementing the Convention suggests that the
159
Convention is non-self-executing. As discussed below, the language and
structure of Chapter 2 of the FAA do not suggest that the Convention is
non-self-executing. Instead, both the text and the legislative history of
Chapter 2 confirm that the Convention, and particularly Article II, is selfexecuting.
Chapter 2 of the FAA was adopted notwithstanding the existence of the
original FAA enacted in 1925. These relatively brief provisions, which were
re-titled “Chapter 1” in 1970, address the enforcement of arbitration
agreements and awards involving “commerce among the several States or
160
with foreign nations . . . .” Most importantly, Section 2 of the Act
provides that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the
revocation of any contract[,]” while Sections 3 and 4 provide for stays of
litigation and orders compelling arbitration where parties have validly
161
agreed to arbitrate. In turn, Sections 9 and 10 of the Act provide for the
162
recognition of arbitral awards, subject to specified exceptions. Other
provisions of what became Chapter 1 of the FAA address miscellaneous
issues, including the ability to appeal, injunctive authority, and the act of
163
state doctrine.
Chapter 2 added eight brief sections to the FAA in order to implement
the Convention. Section 201 is an introductory section, which provides that
“[t]he Convention . . . shall be enforced in United States courts in
164
accordance with this chapter.” Sections 202 and 203 define, in relatively
broad terms, the scope of federal subject matter jurisdiction over actions
arising under the Convention and grant U.S. district courts jurisdiction over
165
those actions. Section 204 deals with venue in federal district courts, and

159.
See, e.g., Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 112 (“[I]t may seem odd to
consider whether the New York Convention is self-executing when Congress has in fact
enacted legislation implementing it.”).
160.
9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16 (2012).
161.
Id. §§ 2–4. Sections 5 and 7 deal with the appointment of arbitrators and taking of
evidence in aid of arbitration. Id. §§ 5, 7.
162.
Id. §§ 9–10.
163.
Id. §§ 6, 8, 12, 15, 16.
164.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
165.
Id. § 202 (“An arbitration agreement or arbitral award arising out of a legal
relationship, whether contractual or not, which is considered as commercial, including a
transaction, contract, or agreement described in section 2 of this title, falls under the
Convention. An agreement or award arising out of such a relationship which is entirely
between citizens of the United States shall be deemed not to fall under the Convention unless
that relationship involves property located abroad, envisages performance or enforcement
abroad, or has some other reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.”); id. § 203.
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Section 205 addresses removal of actions to federal district courts. Section
206 authorizes federal courts to order arbitration in foreign arbitral seats
(remedying a limitation on the injunctive powers of federal district courts
167
under Chapter 1 of the FAA). Finally, Section 207 provides for the
recognition of foreign awards by federal courts, subject to a three-year
statute of limitations, “unless [the court] finds one of the grounds for refusal
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the said
168
Convention[,]” and Section 208 is a residual savings clause for Chapter
169
1’s provisions. As noted above, nothing in Chapter 2 incorporates the
terms of Article II, much less provides more detailed or comprehensive
170
substantive provisions than those in Article II.
Preliminarily, the fact that Chapter 2 provides implementing measures
for the Convention in federal courts does not suggest that the Convention is
non-self-executing. In the words of the Restatement (Fourth) of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States:
[T[he adoption of related legislation is an unreliable indication of
the understanding of U.S. treatymakers with regard to selfexecution. Congress may adopt legislation necessary and proper to
implement any valid treaty commitment. The adoption of U.S.
legislation implementing some aspects of a treaty, or establishing
related procedures, however, does not necessarily suggest that
171
other, substantive aspects of the treaty are not self-executing.
It is particularly unsurprising that a treaty like the Convention, which
imposes significant obligations directly affecting the rights of private parties
in U.S. courts, in a field subject to existing federal legislation, would be
accompanied by legislation containing ancillary provisions addressing
issues such as venue, subject matter jurisdiction, removal, and injunctive

This jurisdictional grant expands upon the scope of § 2 of Chapter 1 of the FAA (which
applies to foreign and interstate commerce).
166.
Id. §§ 204–205.
167.
Id. § 206. Many lower courts had interpreted § 4 of the FAA as limiting orders
compelling arbitration to arbitrations seated in the district of the federal court ordering
arbitration. See BORN, supra note 1, § 14.08[B][1], at 2107–11. Section 206 remedies this gap
in the FAA’s treatment of international arbitration agreements. Id. § 14.08[B][2], at 2111.
168.
9 U.S.C. § 207 (2012).
169.
Section 208 provides that Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to actions under Chapter 2
(which implements the Convention), but only to the extent that Chapter 1 “is not in conflict
with this chapter [2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” Id. § 208.
170.
See supra Part II.B.1.
171.
RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018) (citation omitted). See, e.g., id. (citing S. EXEC.
REP. NO. 110–12, at 7 (2008)) (“noting in relation to 28 extradition treaties that the ‘legal
procedures for extradition are governed by both federal statute and self-executing treaties” and
that “[s]ubject to a contrary treaty provision, existing federal law implements aspects of these
treaties’”).
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authority. These types of provisions address the procedural issues that
inevitably arise and must be resolved in order to allow effective
enforcement of the Convention’s substantive terms. As an international
instrument with 159 Contracting States, the Convention does not, and could
not sensibly, address the types of jurisdictional, venue, and procedural
173
issues that local law regulates.
The enactment of Chapter 2 therefore does not suggest that Congress
regarded the Convention’s provisions as non-self-executing, but only that
Congress wanted to ensure the effective and efficient enforcement of the
174
Convention’s self-executing substantive terms in U.S. courts. This is
precisely how the legislative history describes Chapter 2, explaining that it
addresses issues of “civil procedure” and “establish[es] adequate
175
procedures” for federal courts to apply to the Convention. Indeed, as also
discussed below, Sections 201 and 208 provide that the terms of the

172.
See David H. Moore, Treaties and the Presumption Against Preemption, 2015
BYU L. REV. 1555, 1557 n.10 (2016) (“Although a self-executing treaty might be the subject
of facilitating legislation—legislation that, for example, ‘detail[s] specific legal procedures,
burdens of proof, and remedies for courts applying’ the treaty—the treaty itself would remain
directly enforceable in U.S. courts and should be treated, for preemption purposes, like selfexecuting treaties that lack facilitating legislation.”) (alteration in original) (citing John F.
Coyle, Incorporative Statutes and the Borrowed Treaty Rule, 50 VA. J. INT’L L. 655, 666–67,
nn.4–45 (2010)).
173.
Indeed, this is expressed in Article III. See New York Convention, art. III (“Each
Contracting State shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them in accordance
with the rules of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .”).
174.
Notably, Chapter 2 does not contain provisions giving effect to Article II’s
substantive terms.
175.
See, e.g., 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6, 8 (“The Department of
Justice . . . has suggested that implementing legislation amending certain sections of titles 9
and 28 of the United States Code is desirable. These amendments would be additions to the
Federal Arbitration Act to insure the coverage of the act extends to all cases arising under the
treaty and some changes in Federal civil procedure to take care of related venue and
jurisdictional requirement problems. We will not submit the U.S. ratification of the
convention until this legislation establishing adequate procedures has been approved by the
Congress.”); see also infra pp. 42–43, 52–53.
Unsurprisingly, as the legislative history makes clear, the United States did not ratify the
Convention until Chapter 2’s procedures were in place. That does not suggest that the
Convention is non-self-executing, instead only indicating that the self-executing terms of the
Convention required procedural and ancillary mechanisms to be effectively applied in U.S.
federal courts. See e.g., Hearing to Implement the Convention in the Recognition of Foreign
Arbitral Awards Before the Sen. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 91st Cong. 32 (1970)
(statement of Richard D. Kearney) as reprinted in S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 5 (1970) (“The bill
which is presently before you sets up the legal structure that is required to implement the
Convention.”) [hereinafter 1970 Kearney Statement]; MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE
UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, S. EXEC. DOC. E 90-2, at 1 (1968) (“The
United States instrument of accession to the Convention will be executed only after the
necessary legislation is enacted.”); S. EXEC. REP. NO. 90-10, at 2 (1968) (“Changes in the
[FAA] . . . will be required before the United States becomes party to the Convention.”).
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Convention itself—not the substantive terms of a U.S. statute—will be
enforced in U.S. courts. This conclusion is impossible to reconcile with
176
treatment of the Convention as a non-self-executing treaty.
There are a number of additional aspects of the text and structure of
Chapter 2 of the FAA that confirm that the Convention was understood by
the federal political branches in 1970 to be self-executing. First, as detailed
below, it is clear that Chapter 2 addresses only the application of the
Convention by U.S. federal (and not state) courts. As a consequence, unless
the Convention is self-executing, its substantive terms would not be
applicable at all in state courts. This is an untenable result that, as discussed
below, would likely have placed the United States in violation of its
obligations to enforce international arbitration agreements and awards under
the Convention in 1970 and which neither the President nor Congress would
177
reasonably have intended.
Chapter 2 defines the courts in which its provisions are applicable.
Section 201 provides that the Convention “shall be enforced in United
178
States courts” in accordance with Chapter 2’s provisions.
Other
provisions of Chapter 2 either repeat and clarify the same reference to
179
“United States courts” or refer to Chapter 2’s federal subject matter
180
jurisdiction provisions. It is evident from the text of these provisions that
the term “United States courts,” as used in Chapter 2, means U.S. federal,
not state, courts.
The phrase “United States courts” refers most naturally to a court “of”
or “established by” the United States—namely, a U.S. federal court,
established pursuant to the U.S. Constitution—not a state court established
pursuant to the laws of one of the several states. The term “United States
court” plainly means federal (and not state) courts in other statutory

176.
See infra note 231 and accompanying text. Consistent with this, courts have
directly applied provisions of the Convention, even after noting that Chapter 2 of the FAA
provides implementing legislation. See, e.g., Jain v. de Méré, 51 F.3d 686, 688–89 (7th Cir.
1995); CRT Capital Grp. v. SLS Capital, S.A., 63 F. Supp. 3d 367, 372–74 (S.D.N.Y. 2014);
Basis Yield Alpha Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25, 25 n.3
(N.Y. App. Div. 2014); Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No. CA2009-11-149,
2010 WL 2371991, at *3, *5 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010); Martinez v. Colombian
Emeralds, Inc., Nos. 2007-06, 2007-11, 2009 WL 578547, at *12–13 (V.I. Mar. 4, 2009).
177.
See infra pp. 36–37.
178.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (emphasis added).
179.
Id. § 203 (providing that “[t]he district courts of the United States . . . shall have
original jurisdiction” over an action or proceeding falling under the Convention.) (emphasis
added).
180.
Id. § 206 (providing that “[a] court having jurisdiction under this chapter” may
compel arbitration or appoint arbitrators in accordance with an arbitration agreement); id. §
207 (providing that a party may apply to “any court having jurisdiction under this chapter”
for an order confirming an award) (emphasis added). See supra note 165 and accompanying
text (discussing 9 U.S.C. §§ 202–03).
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settings, including, for example, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,
which grants foreign states immunity from the jurisdiction of “courts of the
182
United States and of the States . . . .”
Indeed, the Supreme Court
distinguishes “United States courts” and “courts of the United States” as
183
compared to state courts in a variety of statutory settings. Even more
directly, Chapter 1 itself uses the term “courts of the United States” or
“United States courts” to refer to what are clearly federal, and not state,
184
courts. The Supreme Court concluded, in fairly clear terms, that Chapter
185
1’s language has this meaning. It is unlikely that Congress intended the

181.
See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 632 (2012) (providing that “a case so removed shall have a
place on the calendar of the United States court to which it is removed relative to that which it
held on the State court from which it was removed.”); 28 U.S.C. § 451 (2012) (defining the
term “court of the United States” as “the Supreme Court of the United States, courts of
appeals, district courts constituted by chapter 5 of this title, including the Court of
International Trade and any court created by Act of Congress the judges of which are entitled
to hold office during good behavior.”); 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2012) (distinguishing between “any
action or suit in any court of the United States or of any State” in circumstances involving
limitations on injunctive relief in labor disputes); FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 cmt. 2 (providing that
“[t]he courts of the United States” include “[f]ederal courts in the continental United States”
as well as federal “district courts in Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands.”).
182.
28 U.S.C. § 1602 (2012).
183.
See, e.g., Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 245–47
(1970) (providing that “court of the United States” in 29 U.S.C. § 104 applies only to federal
courts, not state courts); Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179, 181–82 (1954) (distinguishing
between “United States courts” (which are federal courts) and “courts” (which include state
courts)); see also Woodson v. McCollum, 875 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 2017) (“A state
court is not a ‘court of the United States’ as defined for Title 28 of the United States Code.”);
Steckelberg v. Rice, 184 F. Supp. 3d 746, 758 (D. Neb. 2016) (“[A] ‘court of the United
States’ is a federal court, not a state court . . . .”); Bloodworth v. United States, 623 F. App’x
976, 978 (11th Cir. 2015) (“The phrase ‘court of the United States’ refers to Article III courts
and the courts specified in 28 U.S.C. § 451.”); McAndrew v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 206
F.3d 1031, 1035 n.2 (11th Cir. 2000) (“As defined in Title 28 U.S.C. § 451, the phrase ‘court
of the United States’ in § 1985(2) refers only to Article III courts and certain federal courts
created by act of Congress, but not to state courts.”) (Shaw v. Garrison, 391 F. Supp. 1353,
1370 (E.D. La. 1975) (“As defined in 28 U.S.C. § 451, ‘court of the United States’ refers only
to the Article III courts and certain federal courts created by Act of Congress. It does not
include the various state courts.”), aff’d, 545 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1977), rev’d on other grounds
sub nom. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584 (1978).
184.
9 U.S.C. § 3 (2012) (“courts of the United States”); id. § 4 (“United States district
court”); id. § 7 (“United States courts”; “courts of the United States”); id. §§ 9–11 (“United
States court in and for the district”). Similarly, the reference in § 203 to “district courts of the
United States” suggests that the reference to “United States courts” in § 201 is a reference to
federal courts.
185.
The Supreme Court has made clear that §§ 3 and 4 of the FAA, referring to “courts
of the United States” includes only federal, and not state, courts. Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. 1, 16 n.10 (1984); id. at 29 n.18 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“§ 3’s ‘courts of the
United States’ is a term of art whose meaning is unmistakable. State courts are ‘in’ but not
‘of’ the United States.”); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 477 n.6
(1989); Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 109 (“section 3 by its terms applies to ‘courts
of the United States – a term that means federal courts.”).
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reference in Chapter 2 to “United States courts” to mean something
different from “courts of the United States” and “United States courts” in
186
Chapter 1 of the same statute.
The content and structure of Chapter 2 confirm this conclusion. As
noted above, Section 201 provides that “[t]he Convention . . . shall be
187
enforced in United States courts in accordance with this chapter.”
Importantly, the remainder of “this chapter” only concerns U.S. federal
courts. Sections 202 to 208 of Chapter 2 all apply only in U.S. federal
courts, defining federal subject matter jurisdiction, venue, injunctive power,
removal, and other provisions, with no mention of the Convention’s
188
application in state courts.
Thus, when Section 201 refers to the
Convention being enforced in “United States courts in accordance with this
chapter,” it must refer to federal courts because the remainder of “this
chapter” deals only with the application of the Convention in federal courts
and says nothing about enforcement of the Convention in state courts.
The legislative history of Chapter 2 confirms that the chapter’s
provisions apply only in federal courts. According to Richard Kearney, the
Chairman of the State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private
International Law, Chapter 2 provided a “system of implementation through
189
the United States District Courts.” Indeed, Ambassador Kearney testified
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that the statutory provisions of
Chapter 2 would not “have any effect whatever on state laws” and that the
190
legislation concerns “solely the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts.”
These explanations confirm the relatively unambiguous text of Chapter 2,
191
which limits the provisions of that chapter to U.S. federal courts. Notably,

186.
Where the same term is used within a statute or among related statutes, it is
presumed to have the same meaning. See Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 143 (1994)
(“A term appearing in several places in a statutory text is generally read the same way each
time it appears.”); Dep’t of Revenue v. ACF Indus., Inc., 510 U.S. 332, 342 (1994).
187.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012).
188.
See supra pp. 36–37. The only arguable exception is § 205, dealing with removal of
actions arising under the Convention from state courts. That provision does not deal with
enforcement but instead removal of actions arising under the Convention from state courts, so
the Convention can then be enforced in federal courts. Nothing in Chapter 2 addresses how
the Convention is to be enforced in state courts if actions are not removed from those courts.
Instead, and naturally, procedural and jurisdictional issues relating to enforcement of the
Convention in state courts are left to state law.
189.
1970 Kearney Statement, supra note 175, at 8 (emphasis added).
190.
Id. at 10 (emphasis added) (“The Chairman: . . . Does this legislation have any
effect whatever on State laws? Mr. Kearney: No, Mr. Chairman, it does not. It concerns in
effect solely the jurisdiction of Federal district courts.”). Notably, this colloquy did not refer
to the Convention itself, as distinguished from Chapter 2 of the FAA. As discussed below, the
Convention obviously was regarded as having effects on state law, but this was not the subject
of Ambassador Kearney’s testimony; see also Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 111.
191.
The Restatement of the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investment
Arbitration apparently takes the position that some, but not all, of Chapter 2 of the FAA
applies in state courts. Although the text is unclear, the Restatement appears to treat § 201 as
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these comments were confined to only the jurisdictional and procedural
provisions in the statutory text of Chapter 2 and did not address the
substantive terms of the Convention itself, which were, as discussed below,
192
regarded as self-executing and applicable in both state and federal courts.
In short, nothing in Chapter 2 makes the Convention’s terms applicable
in state courts. As a consequence, if the Convention were non-selfexecuting, nothing in Chapter 2 or otherwise would implement the
Convention in state courts, leaving the Convention’s substantive terms
wholly inapplicable in state courts. It is extremely unlikely that this was the
intention of Congress or the President in ratifying the Convention and
enacting Chapter 2 in 1970—a result that, as discussed further below, would
have placed the United States in almost immediate breach of the Convention
by leaving its terms inapplicable in a substantial majority of American
193
courts.
As discussed above, Article II(3) of the Convention imposes mandatory
requirements for the recognition of arbitration agreements in the courts of
Contracting States: “[t]he court of a Contracting State . . . shall . . . refer the
194
parties to arbitration.” Relatedly, Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the
Convention also impose mandatory requirements for the recognition of
195
arbitral awards in Contracting States’ courts. Inevitably, U.S. state courts
address numerous disputes over the recognition of international arbitration
196
agreements and awards. In 1970, however, arbitration legislation in nearly
one-third of all U.S. states clearly did not provide for the effective
197
198
recognition of arbitration agreements or arbitral awards.

applicable only in federal courts (with the result, according to the Restatement, that only § 2
of Chapter 1 of the FAA applies to the recognition and enforcement of international
arbitration agreements in state courts). See RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L
COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 cmt. b, note a(iii), b(i). As discussed in text, the
conclusion that § 201 applies only in federal courts is fairly clearly correct, given the
unambiguous text and legislative history of the provision. Elsewhere, however, the
Restatement appears to conclude that § 207 of Chapter 2 of the FAA applies in state courts
(and provides for recognition of awards in state courts in accordance with the Convention). Id.
§ 1-5 cmt. b. The Restatement’s approach is contradicted by the text of § 207, which applies
only in “courts having jurisdiction under this chapter,” which is unquestionably a reference to
federal courts, exercising the federal subject-matter jurisdiction conferred by § 202 and § 203.
The Restatement’s approach to § 207 is also contradicted by Chapter 2’s legislative history
(discussed elsewhere), which repeatedly states that Chapter 2 of the FAA was not intended to
have any effect on state courts or state law. As discussed below, the Restatement’s approach is
untenable. See infra p. 81.
192.
See infra Part II.B.3.b.
193.
See infra p. 44.
194.
See supra Part I.B.1.
195.
See supra Part I.B.2 and infra Part II.C.1.
196.
See cases cited infra. notes 233–35.
197.
As discussed below, infra note 264 and accompanying text, statutes and judicial
decisions in a number of states when Chapter 2 of the FAA was enacted in 1970 continued to
deny effect to arbitration agreements or awards. See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65,
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Moreover, as of 1970, the Supreme Court had not held that Section 2 of
the FAA applied in state courts, and the Court would not do so for another
199
15 years. As a consequence, if the Convention were not self-executing,
then, because Chapter 2 of the FAA applies only in federal courts, a
substantial number of state courts would have applied state law (as it existed
in 1970) to international arbitration agreements, which would have not
infrequently denied effect to such agreements. Likewise, the Supreme Court
had not yet held in 1970 (and still has not held) that Sections 9 and 10 of the
200
FAA apply in state courts. As a consequence, if the Convention were nonself-executing, state courts considering requests for recognition of either
arbitration agreements or awards in 1970 would very likely have applied
existing state law and, equally clearly, would have also denied recognition
frequently.
Given the limited scope of Chapter 2, the result of treating the
Convention as non-self-executing would likely have been to place the
United States in violation of its obligations under the Convention following
ratification in 1970. As noted above, nearly one-third of all state arbitration
statutes in 1970 would not have permitted recognition and enforcement of
international arbitration agreements or awards in accordance with the
201
mandatory requirements of the Convention, a result that would have
constituted material non-compliance with the Convention. As discussed
below, the federal political branches carefully examined the substantive
terms of existing state arbitration legislation prior to ratifying the
202
Convention. It is difficult to imagine that, given this knowledge, Congress
and the President would have intended, in ratifying the Convention and
enacting Chapter 2, to put the United States into almost immediate breach of
the Convention’s terms. The most plausible conclusion, rather, is that the
political branches understood that the Convention was self-executing and
therefore applicable in state courts, thereby ensuring U.S. compliance with
the Convention.
Second, although U.S. arbitration law has evolved materially since
1970, Chapter 2’s structure would continue even today to produce untenable
results in state and potentially in federal courts if the Convention were nonself-executing. In particular, as discussed below and as illustrated in
at 7 (testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that, based on a review of state
statutes and judicial decisions in 1970, it was possible to enforce an arbitration agreement for
future disputes in only 36 states).
198.
See infra pp. 75–76.
199.
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1984).
200.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04[B][1][e][iv], at 161–65; RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(ii) (AM. LAW INST.,
Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018). As also discussed below, U.S. state courts are divided on the
question whether §§ 9 and 10 of the FAA apply (and have preemptive effects) in state courts,
with several state courts rejecting this conclusion. See infra note 340 and accompanying text.
201.
See supra note 197.
202.
See infra Part II.B.3.b.
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Appendix A, significant uncertainties and complexities would arise from
treating the Convention as non-self-executing.
If the Convention were non-self-executing, it is unclear what
substantive rules of law would apply today in either federal or state courts to
international arbitration agreements and awards. In federal courts, possible
alternatives for implementation of the Convention would include (a) the
Convention, incorporated by Section 201 of the FAA, for both arbitration
agreements and awards; (b) Chapter 1 of the FAA, incorporated by Section
208, for arbitration agreements, and the Convention, incorporated by
Section 207, for awards; (c) Chapter 1 of the FAA for both arbitration
agreements and awards, incorporated by Section 208. In state courts, most
of these possibilities also arise, as well as the application of state law to
arbitration agreements and/or awards in a significant category of cases.
Neither the text of Chapter 2—which is terse and, on these issues,
equivocal—nor its legislative history allows easy determination of which of
203
these various alternatives is correct. That produces uncertainty as to the
effect of the Convention in American courts and, regardless of which of
these interpretations is accepted, an unsatisfying checkerboard of results for
enforcement of the Convention. These uncertainties and complexities argue
against treating the Convention as non-self-executing because it is unlikely
that the federal political branches would have intended such an uncertain
and confused implementation of U.S. treaty obligations. In contrast, none of
these difficulties arise if the Convention is self-executing.
Third, under any of the legal regimes that would arise from treating the
Convention as non-self-executing, there would be a number of very
substantial differences between the standards applicable to recognition of
international arbitration agreements and awards under the Convention itself,
on the one hand, and those applicable under domestic law, on the other
hand. These differences would exist regardless of whether existing state
arbitration laws or Chapter 1 of the FAA were applied. These differences
between the substantive provisions of the Convention and domestic U.S.
204
law, which are detailed below, would, again, very likely leave the United
States in material breach of the Convention in significant categories of
cases.

203.
Assuming that the Convention is non-self-executing, it is unclear whether § 201 of
the FAA could be read as incorporating the Convention into the FAA (in federal courts).
Section 201 provides that the Convention “shall be enforced in United States courts in
accordance with this chapter[,]” which arguably incorporates the Convention’s substantive
terms into Chapter 2. On the other hand, § 207 contains a separate provision arguably
incorporating only Article V of the Convention (which would appear to be redundant if § 201
incorporated the entire Convention). Moreover, § 201 appears to be in the nature of an
introductory provision, making it clear that the remainder of Chapter 2 provides jurisdictional
and procedural provisions for application of the self-executing terms of the Convention.
Section 208 is equally terse, and equally unclear, providing a residual savings provision for
Chapter 1’s terms.
204.
See infra p. 47.
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Initially, there are a number of very substantial differences between
contemporary state arbitration laws and the Convention’s terms. These
differences vary from state to state but continue to include state laws that
permit revocation of agreements to arbitrate future disputes, exclude
particular disputes from arbitration, impose non-arbitrability rules, apply
idiosyncratic contract law rules, and permit review of the merits of arbitral
205
awards. Application of these various state laws to international arbitration
agreements and awards would entail violation of the Convention’s
requirements that Contracting States recognize and enforce arbitration
agreements and awards, subject to only limited exceptions. Although it is
likely that Section 2 of the FAA now preempts state law applicable to many
international arbitration agreements, including in state courts, this
206
conclusion is not free from doubt. Insofar as state arbitration law applies
to international arbitration agreements subject to the Convention, it is clear
that these standards will frequently differ materially from those under the
Convention.
Moreover, even if one assumed that Section 2 of the domestic FAA
preempted the application of state arbitration laws, there is a lengthy
catalogue of material differences between the treatment of international
arbitration agreements under Article II of the Convention and the treatment
of such agreements under Section 2 of Chapter 1 of the FAA. Among other
things, U.S. courts have consistently held that the Convention and Chapter 1
of the FAA differ materially with respect to: (a) the choice-of-law rules
governing the existence and validity of arbitration agreements (with Articles
II(3) and V(1)(a) prescribing international standards and Chapter 1
207
providing for U.S. state choice-of-law rules); (b) the available substantive
grounds for challenging the validity of international arbitration agreements

205.
See Sebastien Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International
Commercial Arbitration and Their Compatibility with the FAA, 11 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 211,
226, 233 (2000); Daniel A. Zeft, The Applicability of State International Arbitration Statutes
and the Absence of Significant Preemption Concerns, 22 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 705,
790 n.269 (1997).
206.
Section 2 of the FAA presumably preempts state law applicable to international
arbitration agreements and awards which are subject to Chapter 1 of the FAA. See Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984) (stating that in domestic contexts, § 2 of the FAA
applies as preemptive federal law in state courts). Arguably, however, if Congress enacted
Chapter 2 of the FAA with the intention of excluding state courts and state law from the
Convention’s coverage, to preserve state prerogatives in that field, then Chapter 1 of the FAA
should not be interpreted to apply to international arbitration agreements and awards which
are subject to the Convention. Despite Chapter 1’s application to arbitration agreements and
awards relating to “interstate” and “foreign” commerce generally, the more specific provisions
of Chapter 2 should arguably govern arbitration agreements and awards subject to the
Convention.
207.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 4.04[A][2][j][iv], at 535–36; RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW
INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (noting “differences in the applicable law” under Article II
and § 2 of FAA); supra pp. 8–9. I.B.1.
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(with Article II(3) prescribing limited international grounds and Chapter 1
208
prescribing broader domestic grounds);
(c) the scope of the nonarbitrability exception to the enforceability of arbitration agreements (which
209
is narrower under Article II than Chapter 1); (d) the form requirements for
international arbitration agreements (with Article II(1) and (2) providing
210
different written form requirements than Chapter 1); (e) the courts’
obligation to “refer the parties to arbitration” under Article II(3) of the
Convention and the absence of such a requirement under Section 2 of the
211
FAA (in contrast to Sections 3 and 4 of the FAA); (f) the courts’ power to
enforce an agreement to arbitrate in a non-U.S. arbitral seat (which is
212
required under the Convention and unavailable under Chapter 1); (g) the
United States’ reciprocity reservation, establishing an exception to the
Convention’s obligations for arbitration agreements and awards made in
213
non-Convention states (which is not included in Chapter 1); and (h) the
federal policies favoring enforcement of international arbitration agreements
subject to the Convention (which have repeatedly been held to be more
214
expansive than under Chapter 1).
208.
See supra Part I.B.1. Compare New York Convention, art. II, ¶ 3 (“null and void,
inoperative or incapable of being performed”), with 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012) (“such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”).
209.
See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 638–
39 (1985) (antitrust claims are arbitrable pursuant to Convention, even if they would not be
under domestic FAA); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974) (securities
law claims are arbitrable pursuant to Convention, even if they would not be under domestic
FAA); Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 675 F.3d 355, 370–71 (4th Cir. 2012) (New York
Convention “ ‘expressly compels the federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements,’
notwithstanding jurisdiction conferred on such courts to adjudicate Seaman’s Wage Act
claims.”); Francisco v. Stolt Achievement MT, 293 F.3d 270, 273–74 (5th Cir. 2002); see also
1 BORN, supra note 1, § 6.02[A], at 946–47, § 6.03[C][4], at 964–65. Compare New York
Convention, arts. II, ¶ 1, V, ¶ 2(a)–(b), with 9 U.S.C. § 2.
210.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 5.02[A][5][c], at 700. Compare New York Convention,
art. II, ¶¶ 1–2, with 9 U.S.C. § 2.
211.
Compare New York Convention, art. II, ¶ 3 (“refer the parties to arbitration”), with
9 U.S.C. § 2. Chapter 1’s requirements regarding enforcement of arbitration agreements by
stays or orders compelling arbitration are contained in §§ 3 and 4, not § 2. See also SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 346–47 (2006) (“[W]here a treaty provides for a particular
judicial remedy . . . . Courts must apply the remedy as a requirement of federal law”).
212.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 14.07[C], at 2097–98. Compare New York Convention,
art. II, ¶ 3, with 9 U.S.C. § 4.
213.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 2.03[G], at 342–43, § 22.02[F], at 2970–78. Compare
New York Convention, arts. I, ¶ 1, XIV, with 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16. The reciprocity reservation is
of limited (but some) practical importance today, because 159 states have ratified the
Convention; the situation was very different in 1970, when the United States was the 36th
Contracting State to ratify the Convention.
214.
See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631 (“[S]ince this Nation’s accession in 1970 to
the Convention and the implementation of the Convention in the same year by amendment of
the [FAA], that federal policy applies with special force in the field of international
commerce.”) (internal citation and footnote omitted); Republic of Ecuador v. Chevron Corp.,
638 F.3d 384, 393 (2d Cir. 2011) (federal policy favoring arbitration “is even stronger in the
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The Restatement of U.S. Law of International Commercial and
Investment Arbitration suggests that Section 2 of the domestic FAA and
Article II of the Convention provide “essentially equivalent” standards for
215
recognition of arbitration agreements. That suggestion is incorrect; as
outlined above, there are material differences in the standards currently
216
applicable to arbitration agreements under Section 2 and Article II. These
(and other) differences reflect the unsurprising fact that the standards
applicable to domestic arbitration agreements under a domestic U.S. statute,
217
enacted by Congress in 1925, differ significantly from those applicable
under an international treaty, negotiated without material U.S. involvement
in 1958, binding on 159 Contracting States and prescribing standards for
218
international arbitration agreements. It is almost inevitable, but in any
event clear, that the standards under Article II of the Convention are
materially different from those under Section 2 of the FAA. Harmonizing
219
divergent national laws is a central objective of the Convention, and those
divergences are what plainly appear from a comparison of the Convention
and Chapter 1 of the FAA.
The existence of these material differences between the standards under
Article II of the Convention and Section 2 of the FAA produces a highly
unsatisfactory result, entailing non-trivial U.S. non-compliance with its
220
obligations under the Convention. That is because Section 2 currently
context of international business transactions where arbitral agreements promote the smooth
flow of international transactions by removing the threats and uncertainty of time-consuming
and expensive litigation.”) (alteration and quotations omitted); Sourcing Unlimited, Inc. v.
Asimco Int’l, Inc., 526 F.3d 38, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (“[T]he national policy favoring arbitration
has extra force when international arbitration is at issue.”); David L. Threlkeld & Co. v.
Metallgesellschaft Ltd. (London), 923 F.2d 245, 248 (2d Cir. 1991) (“This treaty—to which
the United States is a signatory—makes it clear that the liberal federal arbitration policy
applies with special force in the field of international commerce.”) (internal quotation
omitted).
215.
RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2
reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018).
216.
See supra pp. 47–48; see also Suazo v. NCL (Bahamas), Ltd., 822 F.3d 543, 546–
48 (11th Cir. 2016) (“[T]he broad defenses applicable in the context of domestic arbitration
are not generally available in cases governed by the New York Convention.”); Variblend Dual
Dispensing Sys., LLC v. Seidel GmbH & Co., KG, 970 F. Supp. 2d 157, 164 (S.D.N.Y. 2013)
(“The New York Convention supplies a limitation on the FAA’s ordinary standard that statelaw principles determine whether an arbitral contract has been formed.”).
217.
See supra note 73 and accompanying text; Sabra A. Jones, Historical Development
of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 MINN. L. REV. 240, 250–51 (1928).
218.
See supra Part I.A.
219.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
220.
Treating the Convention as non-self-executing, and subjecting international
arbitration agreements to Chapter 1 of the FAA, also leaves the future enforcement of
international arbitration agreements subject to the domestic FAA’s local standards. Those
standards are developed principally for a different (domestic) context and set of different
(domestic) agreements, and they will almost certainly diverge at various points in the future
from the Convention’s international standards. Again, one of the principal objects of any
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provides, in many material respects, less favorable standards for recognition
and enforcement of arbitration agreements than Article II of the Convention.
Moreover, treating the Convention as non-self-executing also results in the
application of different standards to international arbitration agreements in
U.S. state and federal courts, with Article II of the Convention applying in
federal courts, through either Section 201 or Section 208 of the FAA, and
221
Section 2 of the FAA applying in state courts. This result would frustrate
222
the objectives of uniformity, both generally in U.S. treaty application and
223
specifically with regard to the Convention (as discussed above). It is again
difficult to imagine that the federal political branches intended such results
when they ratified the Convention and enacted Chapter 2 of the FAA.
Fourth, there is a further difficulty arising from treating the Convention
as non-self-executing, which results from the jurisdictional reach of the
domestic FAA. It is clear that the Convention applies more broadly (to all
international arbitration agreements and to all “foreign” and “non-domestic”
awards) than Chapter 1 of the FAA (which applies only to agreements and
224
awards that involve the “foreign commerce” of the United States). Thus,
Section 1 of the FAA (requiring U.S. commerce “with foreign nations”)
would not apply to a substantial category of international arbitration
agreements between non-U.S. parties (e.g., Chinese and German; South
African and Brazilian) engaged in non-U.S. transactions or to an equally
substantial category of awards made in non-U.S. arbitral seats (e.g., Paris;
international treaty, and particularly the Convention, is to prevent such divergences. See supra
Parts I.A–B.
221.
As discussed below, the possibility of removal from state to federal court would not
bring the United States into compliance with the Convention and would not have been
regarded by the U.S. political branches as a tenable means of implementing the Convention.
See infra pp. 60–61.
222.
See Lozano v. Montoya Alvarez, 572 U.S. 1, 13 (2014) (emphasizing the “need for
uniform international interpretation of the [Hague] Convention.”); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S.
1, 16 (2010) (“ ‘[U]niform international interpretation’ of the [Hague] Convention is part of
the Convention’s framework.”); Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 677 (2005) (discussing
whether an ICJ interpretation of the Vienna Convention should be followed “for sake of
uniform treaty interpretation . . . ?”); El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S.
155, 157 (1999) (“[Warsaw] Convention’s central endeavor to foster uniformity . . . .”).
223.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
224.
Compare New York Convention, art. I, ¶ 1 (“arbitral awards made in the territory
of a State other than the State where recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought”),
and id. art. II, ¶ 2 (international “arbitration agreement”), with 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2012)
(“commerce among the several States or with foreign nations”). Section 1 of the FAA extends
to the limits of Congress’ domestic authority over interstate commerce and, presumably, over
foreign commerce. Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 272–73 (1995).
Importantly, however, on any view, foreign commerce with the United States requires some
connection to the United States; see also Albert S. Abel, The Commerce Clause in the
Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432 (1941);
Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 962 (2010). A
very significant proportion of all international contracts and arbitration agreements, between
wholly non-U.S. parties and involving entirely foreign transactions, have no such connection.
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Singapore) in arbitrations between non-U.S. parties. It is fair to say,
notwithstanding the breadth of Congress’s foreign commerce power, that
substantially more international arbitration agreements and awards fall
outside Congress’s legislative authority—but within the Convention’s
225
scope —than those which fall within Congress’s authority.
The jurisdictional limitation of Section 1 of the FAA restricts the reach
of the substantive rules prescribed by Section 2 of the Act, in both federal
226
and state courts. As a consequence, if the Convention were not selfexecuting, and only Section 2 of the FAA implemented Article II of the
Convention, then a significant number of international arbitration
agreements that are within the Convention’s scope but do not involve U.S.
“foreign commerce” would be subject to state, not federal, law in U.S. state
227
courts. The same analysis applies to Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA as
228
applied to arbitral awards. As already discussed, these results would
almost certainly place the United States in serious breach of its obligations
under the Convention with respect to these agreements and awards.
Again, it is unlikely that the U.S. political branches intended the
unsatisfactory and uncertain results summarized above. Rather, the
straightforward, sensible result that the federal political branches much
more plausibly intended in ratifying the Convention and enacting Chapter 2
was that the Convention would be self-executing and therefore applicable in
both state and federal courts alike; in turn, Chapter 2 provided the
procedural rules necessary to facilitate the Convention’s application in
federal courts, while analogous jurisdictional, venue, and other procedural
issues in state courts would be addressed by state law. Indeed, this is
precisely how the FAA’s legislative history describes Chapter 2: “These
amendments would be additions to the Federal Arbitration Act to insure the
coverage of the act extends to all cases arising under the treaty and some
changes in Federal civil procedure to take care of related venue and
229
jurisdictional requirement problems.”
Under this analysis, Section 201 rests on the premise, and expressly
provides, that it is the Convention itself, as a self-executing treaty, that is
applicable in state and federal courts, with Chapter 2 of the FAA supplying
225.
It is clear that the treaty power gives the United States the authority to conclude
treaties governing international matters that are not within U.S. foreign commerce. See
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433–34 (1920); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 302 cmt. d, 303 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
226.
Section 2 of the domestic FAA applies to “[a] written provision in any maritime
transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce[,]” defined in § 1 as
commerce of the United States with foreign nations. Section 2’s preemptive effects extend no
further than prescribed by § 1.
227.
Indeed, if § 201 of Chapter 2 of the FAA does not incorporate the Convention, and
Article II of the Convention is enforceable in federal courts only by reason of § 2 of the FAA,
applied through § 208’s saving clause, then the same issues arise in federal court.
228.
See infra p. 75.
229.
1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 5–6.
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ancillary provisions to facilitate enforcement of the Convention in federal
230
courts. This is the most natural reading of Section 201’s language, which
provides that “the Convention . . . shall be enforced in United States courts
in accordance with this Chapter.” This is a formula declaring that it is the
substantive terms of the Convention itself, as a self-executing treaty, that are
“enforced in U.S. courts” rather than the terms of a federal statutory
231
provision.”
This is also the most straightforward approach to the Convention—
simply treating it as the supreme Law of the Land, in both federal and state
courts, rather than leaving the recognition of international arbitration
agreements to a checkerboard of uncertain standards, some of which fairly
clearly do not satisfactorily implement the Convention’s terms. As outlined
above, the various permutations of U.S. arbitration law that would result
from treating the Convention as non-self-executing are complex and
uncertain (involving various possible combinations of Chapter 1 and
232
Chapter 2 of the FAA and state law). These complexities defy accessible
description and are illustrated in Appendix A. As noted above, it is difficult
to imagine that the United States—in ratifying a treaty intended to provide
uniform international standards to enforce international arbitration
agreements more effectively and efficiently—would have intended such
uncertain and unsatisfying results.
Unsurprisingly, but importantly, this is also exactly the conclusion that
state courts have reached. They have consistently applied the Convention
directly in state court proceedings, a result that can only be reached, given
233
the terms of Chapter 2 of the FAA, if the Convention is self-executing. As
230.
See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
231.
This conclusion has force with respect to Article II of the Convention. Unless the
Convention were self-executing, it is very difficult to see how Article II would be “enforced in
United States courts” because nothing in Chapter 2 of the FAA further implements the
substantive provisions of that Article. Moreover, § 208 provides that Chapter 1 of the FAA
applies to actions under Chapter 2 only to the extent that Chapter 1 “is not in conflict with this
chapter [2] or the Convention as ratified by the United States.” 9 U.S.C. § 208 (2012)
(emphasis added). The italicized phrase again indicates that it is the substantive terms of the
Convention itself, not the FAA’s implementing legislation, that applies in U.S. courts.
232.
As illustrated in Appendix A, if the Convention is self-executing, then its
provisions apply identically in both state and federal courts – just as one would expect of a
treaty. If, however, the Convention were not self-executing then a bewildering range of
possible results arises under Chapters 1 and 2 of the FAA.
233.
See Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2009); Cooper v. Ateliers de la Motobecane, S.A., 57 N.Y.2d 408 (N.Y. 1982) (Convention
does not permit state courts to issue pre-arbitration orders of attachment); Basis Yield Alpha
Fund (Master) v. Goldman Sachs Grp., Inc., 980 N.Y.S.2d 21, 25 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014)
(“motion court properly held that the purported document containing an arbitration clause did
not meet the writing requirements of the New York Convention . . . .”); Drexel Burnham
Lambert, Inc. v. Ruebsamen, 531 N.Y.S.2d 547, 550–52 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (same); Shah
v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (“[T]his arbitration is
governed by the UN Convention, and pursuant to the terms thereof, we find that pre-judgment
attachment is prohibited.”); Faberge Int’l Inc. v. Di Pino, 491 N.Y.S.2d 345, 348 (N.Y. App.
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one state court held, “[a]n arbitration agreement between residents of
different countries is governed by the New York Convention . . . provided
234
both countries are signatory nations to the Convention.” Or, in the words
of another state court, “since the New York Convention applies, [the
plaintiff] cannot raise an unconscionability defence to the enforcement of
235
the arbitration clause against it.” In contrast, no state court appears to have
held that the Convention is not self-executing.
Finally, the Charming Betsy presumption also argues in favor of
treating the Convention as self-executing. The Charming Betsy canon
provides that U.S. statutes are presumed not to conflict with the United
States’ obligations under international law: “an act of Congress ought never
to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible
236
construction remains . . . .” The Charming Betsy presumption generally is
237
not applied in considering the self-executing status of treaties.
Nonetheless, the presumption ought, in principle, to apply in ascertaining
legislative intentions in cases where Congress enacts implementing
legislation in conjunction with the United States’ ratification of a treaty,
such as with the New York Convention. The combined actions of the
federal political branches in ratifying a treaty and enacting implementing
legislation ought not to be interpreted as violating U.S. treaty obligations “if
any other possible construction remains.” Indeed, one would expect that, in
concluding a formal treaty and enacting implementing legislation, the U.S.
political branches would be particularly attentive to ensuring that their
238
combined actions comply with international law.
Here, given the relatively clear limitations of Chapter 2 of the FAA to
federal courts, compliance with U.S. obligations under the Convention
requires interpreting the Convention as self-executing. If the Convention
were non-self-executing, then state law would apply to a substantial number
of international arbitration agreements and awards not involving U.S.
Div. 1985) (pre-arbitration attachment is “unavailable by reason of the existing [state] case
law and the UN Convention . . . .”); CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret
Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549, 562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005) (holding that the arbitration agreements
at issue “are subject to the [New York] Convention enforcement rules.”).
234.
Lloyds Underwriters, 17 So.3d at 737.
235.
Composite Concepts Co. v. Berkenhoff GmbH, No. CA2009-11-149, 2010 WL
2371991, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. June 14, 2010).
236.
Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); see, e.g.,
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 32 (1982) (Charming Betsy presumption “has been a
maxim of statutory construction , , , .”); see also Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194
(1888) (“[T]he courts will always endeavor to construe [treaties and statutes] so as to give
effect to both, if that can be done without violating the language of either . . . .”).
237.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 310 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
238.
A treaty typically imposes more specific, clear-cut obligations than customary
international law. Similarly, U.S. ratification of a treaty necessarily entails the political
branches’ focus on U.S. obligations, which is not necessarily the case where enactment of
legislation against the general backdrop of customary international law is concerned.
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foreign commerce in state courts, resulting in significant violations of the
Convention by those courts. Moreover, even application of the domestic
provisions of Section 2 of the FAA would result in material violations of the
Convention by American courts. As the Charming Betsy presumption
instructs, it is difficult to imagine that the federal political branches intended
to materially violate the U.S.’s obligations in ratifying the Convention and
enacting Chapter 2 of the FAA.

b. History of the Ratification of the New York Convention
The actions and statements of the U.S. political branches during the
process of ratification further support the conclusion that the Convention is
239
self-executing. Although these views are confused about some issues,
they display a consistent recognition that the Convention would be
applicable in both state and federal courts and that the Convention’s terms
would produce materially different results from those under existing state
240
arbitration legislation.
Preliminarily, there is no indication in the U.S. ratification process that
the Convention was considered non-self-executing. In particular, nothing in
241
the 1958 Report of the U.S. Delegation to the New York Conference, the
242
1968 Report of the U.S. State Department to President Lyndon Johnson,
or President Johnson’s Letter of Transmittal of the Convention to the
243
Senate suggests that the Executive Branch viewed the Convention or any
of its particular provisions as non-self-executing. Likewise, as discussed
above, none of the legislative materials associated with Chapter 2 of the
FAA, enacted in conjunction with ratification of the Convention in 1970,
244
contain any such statement or suggestion on the part of Congress.
In contrast, there are important affirmative indications of the
Convention’s self-executing status. At the conclusion of the Conference, the
U.S. Delegation advised against ratification of the Convention on the
239.
Among other things, statements by the State Department during the ratification
process incorrectly suggested that the Convention was outside the federal treaty power,
Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 116 (“Commercial arbitration does not lie within the
traditional limits of the treaty power”); that the Convention would result in domestic awards
made in one U.S. state being treated as “foreign” awards under the Convention in other U.S.
states, id. at 111–12; and that the Convention would apply to domestic arbitration agreements.
Id. at 112 (Article II would “extend the treaty rule to purely domestic contracts”).
240.
There is virtually no evidence, apart from the text of the FAA and the testimony of
Executive Branch officials to Congress, regarding the views of either the Senate or the House
of Representatives. The limited comments from congressional members were directed almost
entirely to extraneous matters, not relevant to the Convention’s status. The Senate devoted
much of its attention to Ambassador Kearney’s rank and to the International Court of Justice’s
role in international affairs. See, e.g., 1970 Kearney Statement, supra note 175, at 8–9, 11–15.
241.
Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 95.
242.
KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17.
243.
S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 90–118 (1968).
244.
See H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1–2 (1970).
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grounds that its provisions would override state law in a substantial number
245
of states. In the words of the Delegation’s Report, “[t]he convention, if
accepted on a basis that assures [meaningful advantages on the United
States], will override the arbitration laws of a substantial number of States
246
and entail changes in State and possibly Federal court procedures” and
247
“make rather substantial changes in United States domestic law.”
Similarly, “the United States would be able as a constitutional matter to
adhere to the convention without any reservations whatsoever, [but to] do
so, however, would entail interference with the laws and judicial
248
procedures of a substantial number of the States.”
The Delegation concluded that neither the Executive Branch nor the
249
Senate would support such results as a matter of either politics or policy.
The Delegation also raised the possibility of a U.S. “federal-state”
reservation under Article XI of the Convention, which would declare the
Convention inapplicable where the law of a particular U.S. state conflicted
250
with the Convention’s terms
but ultimately rejected this as

245.
Delegation Report, supra note 8, at 112 (Article II “raises the greatest difficulty
from the standpoint of United States law,” because “[t]his provision is in conflict with the
laws of a majority of the States.”). The Delegation’s Report observed that a majority of state
arbitration laws at the time provided that “a contract for the submission of future disputes to
arbitration is held to be revocable by either of the parties at any time before the award is
actually rendered” and that “[i]n fact, only 17 States have expressly recognized the
irrevocability of agreements to arbitrate future disputes.” Id. The Delegation noted similar
conflicts between state laws and Articles IV and V of the Convention. Id. at 112–13 (noting
differing treatment of proof of awards (under Article IV) and exceptions to obligation to
recognition (under Article V)).
246.
Id. at 95 (emphasis added). The Delegation also concluded, less clearly, “[t]he legal
situation . . . is plainly untenable, since adherence to the convention in a manner entailing full
acceptance of the principle of irrevocability [as provided by Article II] would require so
extensive an overriding of State laws.” Id. at 112 (emphasis added). In contrast to the
statements quoted in text, this latter comment might arguably contemplate future legislative
action to implement the Convention. In contrast, statements that the Convention “will . . .
override” state law and “make rather substantial changes” in U.S. law are fairly clearly
statements that the Convention itself would have direct legal effects.
247.
Id. at 117 (emphasis added).
248.
Id. at 115 (emphasis added).
249.
Id. at 116 (Convention’s effects on state law make it doubtful that “any proposal for
adherence on such a basis would prove acceptable to the Senate”); id. at 117 (United States
could only adhere to Convention “in a meaningful and effective way” by accepting
“substantial changes in United States domestic law” and “exacerbating Federal-State
relations”).
250.
Id. at 115 (“The United States would be required as a practical matter to exclude
from coverage, by invoking the ‘federal state clause,’ arbitrations cognizable and awards
enforceable under State law.”).
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251

impracticable. The Delegation therefore recommended “strongly” against
252
U.S. signature or ratification of the Convention.
The explicit basis for the Delegation’s recommendation was that, absent
a reservation regarding state law, the Convention would “override,” “make
rather substantial changes in,” or “entail interference with” the laws of a
253
majority of the several States.
In the Delegation’s view, these
consequences of U.S. ratification were untenable. These views, which were
central to the Delegation’s recommendation, rested on the premise that the
Convention was self-executing. This is reflected in its references to
“overriding” or “changing” state law. Particularly when considered in the
context of Article XI of the Convention, addressing the Convention’s
254
application in federal or non-unitary states, and in light of the fact that the
Delegation considered, but rejected, a federal-state reservation, it is very
difficult to avoid a conclusion that the Convention was understood by the
Delegation to be self-executing.
Despite the Delegation’s negative views, the United States took steps a
decade later, beginning in 1968, to ratify the Convention. Those steps
occurred with the Delegation’s views regarding the Convention’s selfexecuting status clearly in mind, in part because the Executive Branch
255
needed to justify its reversal of the U.S. attitude toward the Convention. A
central element of the Executive Branch’s support for ratification of the
Convention in 1968 and 1970 was its view that state arbitration law changed
materially since 1958, with the result that U.S. ratification of the
Convention would no longer have the sweeping impact on state law that the
256
Delegation previously emphasized.
Ambassador Kearney testified in 1968 that the Executive Branch
carefully considered the Delegation’s previous concerns regarding “the
extent to which this convention might change the law in the various States
257
of the Union and the effect it might have on the State courts.” Responding
to that concern, Ambassador Kearney did not say that these concerns were
misplaced because the Convention would be non-self-executing or would
251.
Id. at 116 (noting possibility of “reservation specially adjusted to the United States
federal system” but rejecting this possibility on multiple grounds, including that adherence
“on the basis for the ‘federal state clause’” would “be of little practical value”).
252.
Id. at 115 (“Delegation recommends strongly that the United States not sign or
adhere to the convention”).
253.
See supra Part II.B.3.b.
254.
See supra p. 6.
255.
See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 6 (“[The] situation has changed
rather dramatically over the past 10 years”); H.R. REP. NO. 91-1181, at 1–2 (1970).
256.
1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 4 (“[T]he judicial attitude has now
changed in partial consequence, at least, of the widespread enactment of statutes which in
varying degrees declare arbitration agreements to be irrevocable and provide for their specific
enforcement.”); id. at 7 (1968) (“[T]here have been a number of other changes in State law
which support the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate in the future.”).
257.
Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
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not have effects on state law. Instead, he explained that the adoption of the
Uniform Arbitration Act in a number of states in the years following 1958,
258
combined with other developments in state arbitration law, meant that
concerns about the Convention’s impact on state law were now much more
limited than they had been in 1958:
[A]s compared to 10 years ago when our delegation felt there was a
majority of State law opposed to the general theory of the
convention this is now completely reversed, and there is a
substantial majority of State law in favor of it and this will continue
259
to increase.
As a consequence, in contrast to the situation in 1958, ratification of the
Convention would no longer result in dramatic changes in the law in a
substantial majority of the States. Instead, state law now prescribed rules
that were materially more similar to those of the Convention than in 1958,
thereby significantly reducing the policy and political objections raised by
the Delegation’s Report. Relatedly, Ambassador Kearney also raised—but
firmly rejected—the possibility of a U.S. reservation limiting the effect of
260
the Convention to federal courts (as also had occurred when such a
261
reservation was considered in 1958).
The most reasonable interpretation of these actions is that the Executive
Branch continued to understand in 1968 and 1970, as the U.S. Delegation
understood in 1958, that the Convention would be self-executing. There are
reasonably clear statements to this effect in the ratification process in 1968

258.
Id. at 6 (“At that time the delegation said in its report that there were, I think, some
25 [sic] States whose laws might be affected by the convention. That situation has changed
rather dramatically over the past 10 years. For one thing, the Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws was just around this time introducing its uniform law on arbitration
procedures, and this uniform law has been and is being accepted by an increasing number of
States, and the uniform law, in effect covers all of the requirements for internal U.S. practice
which are contained in the convention for foreign problems.”).
259.
Id. at 7. Ambassador Kearney also testified that, contrary to the views of the U.S.
Delegation in 1958, it was clear that arbitration agreements affecting interstate or foreign
commerce were within the federal government’s authority. 1970 Kearney Statement, supra
note 175, at 7 (“In the Prima Paint Case . . . , however, the Supreme Court made it quite clear
that arbitration agreements relating to interstate or foreign commerce were fully within the
ambit of Federal Law.”).
260.
KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 22 (“It would, however, run counter to
the express provisions of [Article XI] for the United States to seek to take advantage of its
provisions with respect to foreign arbitral awards arising out of the commercial relationships.
The Federal Arbitration Act . . . and the decisions of U.S. Courts relating thereto show that
legislation on arbitration is clearly within the competence of the Federal Government.”); see
also KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 34 (1968) (“In addition to the ground that you
mention, there is Article XI of the Convention which would permit our Government to limit
its adherence to the federal jurisdiction.”).
261.
See supra p. 56.
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262

and 1970 and no contrary statements. Moreover, the Executive Branch
devoted careful attention to the Delegation’s Report and its concerns about
the Convention’s effects on state law. This branch responded not by
disagreeing or suggesting that the Convention would have no effect on state
law, but by emphasizing the developments in state arbitration law since
1958, which brought U.S. law more closely into line with the Convention’s
provisions. It was this changed attitude of the several states toward
arbitration that the Executive Branch saw as providing the political and
263
policy basis for a change in U.S. attitude toward the Convention. At the
same time, however, the Executive Branch’s analysis also made clear that,
while many state laws changed, there remained a non-trivial number of
states (at least 14) whose arbitration law was still inconsistent with the
264
Convention in 1968. Thus, unless the Convention were regarded as selfexecuting, the limited scope of Chapter 2 of the FAA and the content of
these state arbitration laws would have left the United States in breach of its
obligations under the Convention, a result that both the 1958 Delegation and
the Executive Branch in 1968 and 1970 firmly rejected.
Equally important, the Convention’s self-executing status also
dissuaded the United States from making a “federal-state” reservation to the
265
Convention, despite considering the possibility and a material number of
states whose arbitration law still conflicted with the Convention. As
discussed above, if the Convention were not self-executing, and the United
States made no Article XI reservation, then the existence of some state laws
that conflicted with the Convention would have put the United States in
266
immediate violation of its treaty obligations. Simply put, the Executive
Branch concluded that the impact of the self-executing Convention on state
law in 1970 would be less sweeping than in 1958 and therefore politically
acceptable. The Convention’s self-executing status would, at the same time,
ensure U.S. compliance with the treaty, thereby making a reservation under
Article XI unnecessary to ensure U.S. compliance with the treaty. Again,

262.
See, e.g., KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at 18 (“The purpose of [Article II]
is to provide an appropriate treaty rule with respect to agreements to arbitrate.”) (emphasis
added); 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 8 (“[W]ith respect to the filing of an action
in a court without going through the arbitral procedure, if you have agreed to the arbitral
procedure, the convention only requires the court to reject the suit and to refer the party back
to arbitration.”) (emphasis added); id. at 6 (“Another aspect of concern to the delegation was
the extent to which this convention might change the law in the various States of the Union
and the effect it might have on the State courts.”) (emphasis added).
263.
See supra p. 57. The State Department’s Advisory Committee on Private
International Law included representatives of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws, but there was no reported objection to the Convention or its selfexecuting status from the Conference.
264.
See 1968 Kearney Statement, supra note 65, at 7 (1968) (stating that thirty-six
states provided for enforcement of agreement to arbitrate future disputes).
265.
See supra notes 250–51, 260 and accompanying text.
266.
See supra pp. 44, 54.
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the most sensible explanation for these actions was an understanding that
the Convention was self-executing.
Finally, it seems very unlikely that the federal political branches
intended the Convention to be non-self-executing, applying only in federal
(and not state) courts, with the possibility of removal of actions arising
under the Convention to federal courts (under § 205 of the FAA) providing
the only avenue for U.S. compliance with its obligations under the
Convention. That approach contradicts all of the analysis above—of the text
and purposes of Article II, the character of the Convention, and the
ratification history of the Convention—which fairly clearly demonstrates
that Article II is self-executing. Moreover, an approach that left Article II
only enforceable in federal courts, coupled with rights to remove from state
courts, would not comply with the Convention, which mandates that “[t]he
267
court of a Contracting State . . . shall . . . refer the parties to arbitration”
268
and “shall recognize arbitral awards . . . .” The Convention does not
provide that “some” courts of the United States (that is, only federal courts
or just some federal or state courts) must refer parties to arbitration and
recognize arbitral awards; it provides that every court in a Contracting State
must do so.
In particular, the Convention does not allow the United States to require
parties to give up the benefits that state courts, state procedural rules, or
other factors might, in particular circumstances, provide those parties as a
price of obtaining the Convention’s protections. As noted above, state courts
comprise the substantial majority of all American courts, and numerous
269
cases involving the Convention are not removed from state courts —
because parties not infrequently prefer state courts to their federal
counterparts. In these cases, the Convention’s terms are clear, mandatorily
requiring that all American courts, state and federal, refer parties to
270
arbitration and recognize arbitral awards.
Likewise, imposing
requirements of removal from state to federal courts is inconsistent with the
Convention’s fundamental objectives of providing for the prompt and
efficient recognition of international arbitration agreements and awards
271
without idiosyncratic local procedural hurdles and costs.
267.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. II, ¶ 3 (emphasis added).
268.
Id. art. III (emphasis added).
269.
See supra p. 53.
270.
Moreover, as noted above, treating the Convention as non-self-executing would
also result in state law applying in federal courts to arbitration agreements and, arguably,
awards that fall outside of Chapter 1’s jurisdictional scope. See supra p. 45.
271.
See supra Parts I.A–B. As discussed above, Article II(3) requires courts, when
“seized of an action” subject to arbitration, to refer the parties to arbitration, ensuring that
their dispute can be efficiently resolved. See supra Part II.B.1. Nothing permits courts of a
Contracting State to instead refer a party, seeking to enforce an international arbitration
agreement, to some other forum or court. Similarly, Article IV was designed expressly to
permit prompt, efficient recognition of awards. See supra Part I.B.2. Again, nothing permits
courts of Contracting States to instead refer parties to other forums for recognition.
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Moreover, Article XI of the Convention is impossible to reconcile with
application of the Convention in some (federal), but not all (state), courts of
a Contracting State. Under Article XI(b), if a federal state cannot implement
the Convention in constituent states, it must immediately give those states
notice of the Convention and favorably recommend that they adopt the
272
Convention. It is very difficult to see how this provision would permit the
United States simply not to implement the Convention in state courts,
notwithstanding the legislative authority under the U.S. Constitution to do
273
so, and also not make any recommendation that states take steps to
implement the Convention. Again, the Executive Branch’s deliberate
consideration, and rejection, of the possibility of an Article XI reservation
argues decisively against the notion that the United States intended to
comply with the Convention in federal, but not state, courts.
More fundamentally, the proposition of a U.S. treaty that would apply
in federal courts, but not state courts, contradicts both the text and the
purposes of the Supremacy Clause and instead produces a balkanized
treatment of U.S. treaties that is the exact opposite of what the Framers
generally contemplated with respect to the Nation’s international
274
obligations. That same proposition also contradicts the basic objectives of
the Convention to ensure the application of uniform and harmonized
275
international rules to arbitration agreements by further balkanizing the
Convention even within one Contracting State.
Indeed, the suggestion that the Convention applies only in federal and
not state courts would produce a unique approach toward implementation of
a U.S. treaty, which has apparently never been adopted for any other U.S.
treaty or international agreement. At a minimum, if such an unusual
approach was intended, it surely would have been discussed in the
legislative history of the FAA and ratification history of the Convention.
Instead, there is no mention whatsoever in either source that this approach
toward compliance with the Convention’s terms was ever considered, much

272.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. XI(b); see supra p. 6.
273.
In any event, it is very doubtful that the United States could in fact rely on Article
XI(b), because of the scope of the federal treaty power, which clearly extends to international
commercial arbitration. This was apparent to the federal political branches in 1968 and 1970.
See Drahozal, Convention, supra note 14, at 108; KATZENBACH, LETTER, supra note 17, at
22.
274.
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 3, at 43 (John Jay) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(“[A]rticles of treaties, as well as the law of nations, will always be expounded in one sense
and executed in the same manner—whereas adjudications on the same points and questions in
thirteen States, or in three or four confederacies, will not always accord or be
consistent . . . .”); John Jay, Continental Congress (Apr. 13, 1787), reprinted in THE
FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 589, 590 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (finding
it “irrational” to claim that “the same Article of the same treaty might by law be made to mean
one thing in New Hampshire, another thing in New York, and neither the one nor the other of
them in Georgia.”).
275.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
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less implemented. On the contrary, as discussed above, the FAA’s
legislative history clearly reflects the opposite understanding and
276
expectation—that the Convention would apply in state courts.
In sum, the history of the Convention’s ratification in the United States
does not suggest that the Convention is non-self-executing and instead
decisively supports the opposite conclusion. There are no statements in the
ratification history that the Convention is non-self-executing. Instead,
Chapter 2 provides ancillary jurisdictional and procedural provisions
applicable in federal courts based on the premise that it is the Convention’s
substantive terms themselves that will be enforced in accordance with these
ancillary provisions. Likewise, Chapter 2 does nothing to make the
Convention applicable in state courts—a result which strongly indicates that
the Convention must have been regarded as self-executing in order for U.S.
state courts to comply with the United States’ obligations under the
Convention.

4. Position of the U.S. Government
The self-executing nature of Article II of the Convention in the United
States is also confirmed by the position of the U.S. government. It is wellsettled that the Executive Branch’s understanding of a treaty to which the
United States is a party is “entitled to great weight” in the interpretation of
the treaty by U.S. courts, including in assessing whether the treaty is self277
executing.
The Supreme Court frequently defers to the Executive
Branch’s interpretation of treaties and has explained that “[r]espect is
ordinarily due the reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the
278
meaning of an international treaty.” Federal appellate courts and the

276.
See supra Part II.B.3.
277.
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 513 (2008) (citing U.S. government amicus
curiae brief in considering the relevant treaty’s status); Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 15
(2010) (“It is well settled that the Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty is entitled to
great weight.”) (internal quotation omitted). Compare infra note 278.
278.
El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999); see also
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006) (“[T]he meaning given [to treaties] by
the departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is
given great weight.”); Sumitomo Shoji Am., Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184–85, n.10
(1982) (deferring to Executive Branch’s interpretation of treaty).
Commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court may afford less deference to the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of a treaty in circumstances where the treaty’s interpretation
is dispositive as to the Executive Branch’s authority. Sitaraman & Wuerth, Normalization,
supra note 88, at 1968–70; see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–32 (2006)
(declining to defer to Executive Branch’s interpretation of Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions, where this interpretation defined the President’s authority to use military
commissions). This rationale does not apply to the Executive Branch’s interpretation of the
Convention.
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Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States have
279
adopted the same position.
In amicus curiae submissions to the Supreme Court, the U.S.
government expressed its view that “Article II of the Convention is self280
executing.” In so doing, the U.S. government emphasized that “[b]oth the
mandatory nature of Article II(3)’s text, and its direction to the ‘court[s]’
(rather than to the governments) of the contracting States, suggest that the
provision was intended to be immediately enforceable in domestic courts”
281
and is, therefore, self-executing. The U.S. government also observed that
“neither Article II(3) nor Article II(1) . . . appears to envisage that steps
beyond ratification are necessary before the Convention creates binding
282
obligations enforceable in domestic courts.” These considered views of
the U.S. government argue again for the Convention’s self-executing status.
Other Contracting States have generally adopted the same view of the
Convention as the U.S. government. The UNCITRAL Secretariat published
a report in 2008 addressing how Contracting States to the Convention have
283
incorporated it into national law. Based on responses of 108 of the 142
Contracting States (in 2008), the Secretariat reported that “[f]or a vast
majority of States, the New York Convention was considered as ‘selfexecuting’, ‘directly applicable’ and becoming a party to it put the
284
Convention and all of its obligations in action.”
These views of Contracting States support a conclusion that the
Convention, and in particular Article II, is self-executing. As noted above, it

279.
See, e.g., CBF Industria de Gusa S/A v. AMCI Holdings, Inc., 850 F.3d 58, 72 n.6
(2d Cir. 2017) (holding that the U.S. government’s interpretation of the Convention is
“entitled to great weight”); Mobil Cerro Negro, Ltd. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venez,, 863
F.3d 96, 117 (2d Cir. 2017) (accepting the U.S. government’s position that “we owe particular
deference to the interpretation [of a treaty and its enabling act] favored by the United States”);
Georges v. United Nations, 834 F.3d 88, 94 (2d Cir. 2016) (“It is also significant that the
Executive Branch’s interpretation of the [treaty]—an interpretation ‘entitled to great
weight’—accords with our own.”); Swarna v. Al-Awadi, 622 F.3d 123, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2010)
(noting the deference given to executive branch treaty interpretation); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 326(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1987)
(“Courts in the United States . . . will give great weight to an interpretation made by the
Executive Branch.”); RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
280.
Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 7.
281.
Id. at 9.
282.
Id.
283.
Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law, Rep. on the Survey Relating to the Legislative
Implementation of the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/656, at 5 (June 5, 2008).
284.
Id. ¶ 10 (emphasis added). The Secretariat’s report does not further specify the
number of Contracting States that regard the Convention as directly applicable in national
courts. The UNCITRAL Secretariat also notes that “[f]or a number of other States, the
adoption of an implementing legislation was required for the Convention to gain the force of
law in their internal legal order.” Id. ¶ 11.
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is of course the intentions and understanding of the U.S. political branches
285
that are decisive with regard to a treaty’s self-executing status.
Nonetheless, the views of other Contracting States and the UNCITRAL
Secretariat about the meaning of the Convention are also relevant in
considering a treaty’s self-executing status, especially where the U.S.
286
political branches have not indicated that a treaty is non-self-executing.
The Supreme Court has emphasized, including in Medellín, the relevance of
287
this type of “ ‘postratification understanding’ of signatory nations.” Here,
the U.S. government has expressed the same position regarding the
Convention’s self-executing status as that of many other Contracting States,
adding further weight to these conclusions.

5. Judicial Decisions
Although only a limited number of courts have addressed the issue, the
self-executing character of Article II of the Convention is also supported by
the weight of considered authority in U.S. federal and, even more
decisively, state courts. Moreover, the conclusions of U.S. courts are
consistent with the weight of well-reasoned authority from courts in other
Contracting States.
The best-reasoned U.S. judicial analysis of Article II’s status is a
concurring opinion in a Fifth Circuit case that considered whether the
McCarran-Ferguson Act provides that state law reverse-preempts federal
288
law governing the validity of arbitration agreements in insurance policies.
A majority of the Court of Appeals did not reach the question whether
289
Article II is self-executing. The self-executing character of Article II was
addressed, however, in a concurring opinion by Judge Edith Brown
Clement, who concluded that “the plain text of Article II of the Convention
290
compels a finding of self-execution.” She also emphasized that Article
II(3) “is addressed to the courts of contracting States, not to the States
285.
See supra Part II.A.
286.
See supra p. 26.
287.
Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 507 (quoting Zicherman v. Korean Air Lines Co.,
516 U.S. 217, 226 (1996)); see also id. at 517 (“The lack of any basis for supposing that any
other country would treat ICJ judgments as directly enforceable as a matter of their domestic
law strongly suggests that the treaty should not be so viewed in our courts.”); Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 384–85 (2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing decisions of other
contracting states). The Medellín Court did not explain how the decisions of other contracting
states, with different conceptions of self-executing status, were relevant to analysis of this
issue under U.S. law, although it appears to have considered these decisions as relevant to the
treaty’s interpretation, with the treaty’s meaning in turn being relevant to the U.S. political
branches’ understanding regarding its status.
288.
See Safety Nat’l Cas. Corp. v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd’s, 587 F.3d 714, 732–
37 (5th Cir. 2009) (Clement, J., concurring).
289.
Id. at 731 (majority opinion) (“[I]mplemented treaty provisions, self-executing or
not, are not reverse-preempted by state law pursuant to the McCarran-Ferguson Act . . . .”).
290.
Id. at 733 (Clement, J., concurring).
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themselves or to their respective legislatures” and that “[r]eferral to
291
arbitration is mandatory, not discretionary[,]” concluding that “Article II
of the Convention is self-executing and fully enforceable in domestic courts
by its own operation. It is entitled to recognition as ‘the supreme Law of the
292
Land’ under the Supremacy Clause.”
Similarly, the weight of U.S. authority in other contexts applies Article
II directly (albeit usually without discussion or analysis) to give effect to
293
international arbitration agreements. This includes a substantial body of
U.S. federal court authority holding that Article II limits the types of
national law that may be applied to international arbitration agreements
294
under the Convention. Other U.S. federal courts have directly applied the
295
provisions of Article II requiring a “written” arbitration agreement.
In contrast, the very limited U.S. federal authority concluding that the
Convention is not self-executing is dated and rests on cursory reasoning.
The only decision holding Article II as non-self-executing is the Second
296
Circuit’s 1995 ruling in Stephens v. American International Insurance. As
Judge Clement noted in Safety National, however, the panel of the Second
Circuit that rendered this decision “undertook no textual analysis and set
297
forth no reasons to support its conclusion.” Moreover, Stephens was

291.
Id. at 734–35. Judge Clement also observed that Article II’s directive to domestic
courts “leaves no discretion to the political branches of the federal government whether to
make enforceable the [arbitration] agreement-enforcing rule it prescribes; instead, that rule is
enforceable by the Convention’s own terms.” Id. at 735. She reasoned that “[t]reaty provisions
setting forth international obligations in such mandatory terms tilt strongly toward selfexecution.” Id.
292.
Id. at 735–36 (footnote omitted). A dissenting opinion also argued that the
argument that the Convention was self-executing had been waived and that, under the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, the FAA does not preempt state law enacted for regulating the
business of insurance. Id. at 737–53 (Elrod, J., dissenting).
293.
See, e.g., Bautista v. Star Cruises, 396 F.3d 1289, 1301–02 (11th Cir. 2005);
InterGen N.V. v. Grina, 344 F.3d 134, 141 (1st Cir. 2003); Rhone Mediterranee Comagnia
Francese di Assicurazioni E Riassicurazioni v. Lauro, 712 F.2d 50, 54–55 (3d Cir. 1983);
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982); I.T.A.D. Assocs. v. Podar
Bros., 636 F.2d 75, 77 (4th Cir. 1981); McCreary Tire & Rubber Co. v. Ceat S.p.A., 501 F.2d
1032, 1037 (3d Cir. 1974).
294.
See supra p. 10.
295.
See, e.g., Todd v. S.S. Mut. Underwriting Ass’n (Berm.), 601 F.3d 329, 334–35
n.11 (5th Cir. 2010); Sphere Drake Ins. v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666, 669 (5th Cir.
1994); Bitúmenes Orinoco S.A. v. New Brunswick Power Holding Corp., No. 05 Civ.
9485(LAP), 2007 WL 485617, at *11–18 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2007); Chloe Z Fishing Co. v.
Odyssey Re (London) Ltd., 109 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1247–48 (S.D. Cal. 2000); Coutinho Caro
& Co. U.S.A. v. Marcus Trading, Inc., No. 3:95CV2362 AWT, 2000 WL 435566, at *11 (D.
Conn. Mar. 14, 2000); Sen Mar, Inc. v. Tiger Petrol. Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879, 882 (S.D.N.Y.
1991).
296.
Stephens v. Am. Int’l Ins., 66 F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995). One district court
assumed that the Convention is non-self-executing with no substantive analysis. See Foresight
Energy, LLC v. Certain London Mkt. Ins., 311 F. Supp. 3d 1085, 1099 (E.D. Mo. 2018).
297.
Safety Nat’l, 587 F.3d at 737 (Clement, J., concurring).
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decided before the Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín, which prescribed
the current standards for determining when treaty provisions are selfexecuting and supports the conclusion that Article II of the Convention is
298
self-executing.
More importantly, a number of state courts have also applied the terms
299
of Article II directly, which must result from the Convention’s status as a
300
self-executing treaty. Moreover, in applying the Convention, U.S. state
courts have frequently made it clear that it is the Convention—not Chapter 2
301
of the FAA—that they are applying. The reasons include, among others,
that “[a]n arbitration agreement between residents of different countries is
302
governed by the New York Convention[,]” an international arbitration
agreement is “subject to the [New York] Convention enforcement
303
rules[,]”
and “this arbitration is governed by the [New York]
304
Convention . . . .” In contrast, much like federal courts, no reported U.S.
state court decision holds the Convention non-self-executing. These state
court decisions are of particular significance given that the self-executing
character of the Convention has its most obvious and important
consequences in state courts—where, as discussed above, Chapter 2 of the
FAA does not apply.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Medellín has occasionally been
interpreted as suggesting that Article V of the Convention is non-self305
executing. Those interpretations are ill-considered: Medellín does not
argue for the non-self-executing status of the Convention and, instead, is
306
best read as confirming that the Convention is self-executing. Medellín
did not, of course, involve the Convention; instead, it involved the effect of
an International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) judgment in U.S. courts. In

298.
Id.
299.
See supra notes 233–35.
300.
As discussed above, Chapter 2 plainly does not apply in state (as distinguished
from federal) courts. See supra pp. 39–43. As a consequence, state court applications of
Article II must result from the Convention’s self-executing status.
301.
See supra notes 233–35.
302.
Lloyds Underwriters v. Netterstrom, 17 So. 3d 732, 737 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009).
303.
CanWest Glob. Commc’ns Corp. v. Mirkaei Tikshoret Ltd., 804 N.Y.S.2d 549,
562–63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2005).
304.
Shah v. E. Silk Indus. Ltd., 493 N.Y.S.2d 150, 151 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985).
305.
RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-5
reporters’ note b(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (stating, incorrectly, that
“[i]n Medellín, the Supreme Court indicated that, in order for a treaty to have self-executing
status, an express determination to that effect must be found either in the treaty itself or in a
pronouncement by the Senate, and the New York Convention presents neither. Indeed, in
dictum in Medellín, the Court went on to cite the New York Convention as an example of a
non-self-executing treaty.”); id. § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (stating, incorrectly, that “the
Supreme Court listed FAA Chapter 2 as an example of legislation implementing a non-selfexecuting treaty.”).
306.
See supra Parts II.B.1–2.

Fall 2018]

The New York Convention

173

addressing this issue, however, the Supreme Court referred briefly, and by
307
analogy, to the FAA’s implementation of Article V of the Convention. In
particular, the Court cited Chapter 2 of the FAA as one example of
legislative action that illustrated the statement that “[t]he judgments of a
number of international tribunals enjoy a different status because of
308
implementing legislation enacted by Congress.”
Initially, as the U.S. government has observed, this statement
implicated only Article III of the Convention, which provides for the
enforceability of foreign arbitral awards, not Article II, which addresses
309
arbitration agreements; nothing in Medellín suggests that Article II of the
Convention is non-self-executing. Moreover, the Court’s statement was very
brief dictum—a sentence that reasoned by analogy about a different treaty
than that which was before the Court and as to which the Court received no
submissions or argument. It would make no sense for passing dicta of this
sort to be elevated above the standards for determining self-executing status
that the Court set out in Medellín (and which, as discussed above, mandate
treating the Convention as self-executing).
Most importantly, the Medellín dicta does not in fact address whether
the Convention is self-executing. Instead, the Court only observed that
arbitral awards subject to the New York Convention enjoy a different status
than ICJ judgments because of the implementing provisions of Chapter 2 of
310
the FAA. That observation does not state that the Convention is non-selfexecuting and instead only observes, correctly, that, unlike ICJ judgments,
311
Convention awards are the subject of federal implementing legislation.
Critically, however, the fact that the FAA implements the Convention in
federal courts does not suggest that the Convention is non-self-executing.
As discussed in detail above, a self-executing treaty may very well require
or benefit from a degree of implementation to ensure that its provisions can
312
be efficiently and effectively applied in domestic courts. Indeed, as also
discussed above, the text of Chapter 2 confirms the self-executing status of
the Convention by providing that it is the substantive terms of the
Convention itself that apply in federal courts, while supplying ancillary
jurisdictional and procedural provisions to ensure the effective application
313
of those terms by federal courts. In sum, the Medellín Court’s observation

307.
See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 521–22 (2008).
308.
Id. at 521.
309.
See Louisiana Safety Amicus Brief, supra note 140, at 9–10.
310.
Medellín, 552 U.S. at 521–22.
311.
The Court’s observation regarding Convention awards is entirely consistent with
the conclusion, set forth above, that Chapter 2 of the FAA implements the Convention in
federal courts. See supra Part II.B.3.a.
312.
See supra pp. 37–38; RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 310 reporters’ note 8 (AM. LAW INST. 2018).
313.
See supra pp. Part II.B.3.a. As previously discussed, § 201 of the FAA provides
that the Convention shall be “enforced in United States courts in accordance with this
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that Chapter 2 of the FAA gives Convention awards a different status than
ICJ judgments is both correct but irrelevant to the Convention’s selfexecuting status.
Finally, the views of U.S. courts regarding the self-executing status of
Article II are not unique. Instead, they are consistent with holdings in other
Contracting States, which, as noted above, may be relevant to the
314
determination of a treaty’s self-executing status in the United States.
Courts in a number of other Contracting States have held that the
Convention is directly applicable in national courts, making observations
similar to those relevant in determining whether a treaty is self-executing
under U.S. law. For example, the Italian Corte di Cassazione held that the
Convention
[C]reate[s] a fully autonomous micro-system, either because treaty
provisions (in respect of both the requirements for enforcement of
the foreign award and the grounds to oppose enforcement) prevail
over the provision in the [Italian] Code of Civil Procedure, or
315
because of the Convention’s completeness and self-sufficiency.
Similarly, the Singapore High Court has referred to the “self-execution”
316
regime that Article II(3) creates. Courts in Switzerland and Japan have
also treated the Convention as self-executing, without the need for statutory
317
incorporation into domestic law. These decisions, like the results of the
318
UNCITRAL survey of Contracting States, provide additional, if indirect,
confirmation for the conclusion that Article II is also self-executing as a
matter of U.S. law.

chapter,” plainly giving the Convention (and Convention awards) a status not possessed by
ICJ judgments. See supra p. 52.
314.
See supra Part II.A.
315.
Cass., 8 ottobre 2008, n. 24856, 34 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 644, 647 (It.) (emphasis
added).
316.
See FirstLink Invs. Corp. Ltd. v. GT Payment Pte Ltd., [2014] S.G.H.C.R. 12, ¶ 19
(Sing.) (“Art II(3) of the New York Convention . . . may be considered a self-executing
provision which prescribes substantive rules of international law applicable to the formation
and validity of [an] international arbitration agreement.”).
317.
See, e.g., Tribunal fédérale [TF] [Federal Tribunal] Feb. 7, 1984, 110 DECISIONI
DEL TRIBUNALE FEDERALE SVIZZERO [DTF] II 54 (Switz.) (reasoning that Article II of the
Convention is directly applicable in Swiss courts); Elliott Geisinger, Implementing the New
York Convention in Switzerland, 25 J. INT’L ARB., 691, 693 (2008) (“[N]o implementing
legislation was necessary for the New York Convention to come into force in Switzerland.
The New York Convention is thus applied as a self-executing treaty in the Swiss legal
system.”); Yasuhei Taniguchi & Tatsuya Nakamura, Japanese Court Decisions on Article V
of the New York Convention, 25 J. INT’L ARB., 857, 857 (2008) (arguing that Japanese courts
directly apply Convention as self-executing under Japanese law).
318.
See supra pp. 64–65.
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C. Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the
New York Convention Are Self-Executing
The foregoing analysis of Article II applies with nearly equal force to
Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention. Although there is limited
authority on the question, it is relatively clear that Articles III, IV, V, and VI
are self-executing for the same reasons that Article II is self-executing.

1. Text of Articles III, IV, V, and VI
Like the text of Article II, the language of Articles III, IV, V, and VI is
mandatory. As discussed above, Article III provides that all Contracting
States “shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and enforce them” in
319
accordance with local procedural rules. Article V is equally mandatory,
providing that recognition of an award may be refused “only if” one of the
320
exceptions specified in Articles V(1) and V(2) is applicable. As discussed
above, U.S. and other national courts have uniformly held that these
321
provisions are mandatory.
Articles III, IV, V, and VI are also plainly, if in somewhat different
terms than Article II(3), directed specifically to national courts. Article III
requires recognition of awards “in accordance with the rules of procedure of
322
the territory where the award is relied upon . . . .” National courts—unlike
other branches of government—characteristically recognize awards and
apply procedural rules and thus are the only arm of government that can
carry out this mandate. Similarly, Article IV is addressed to “application[s]”
323
for recognition and the proof of awards. This directive again plainly
references national court proceedings, where applications are typically
made, and not executive or legislative bodies. Even more clearly, Article V
repeatedly refers to the “competent authority” of the recognition forum,
prescribing the circumstances in which those “authorities” may deny
319.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III (emphasis added). Article III goes on
to provide that there “shall” not be imposed more onerous conditions or fees for foreign
awards than for domestic awards.
320.
Id. art. V.
321.
See supra note 43.
322.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. III. Unsurprisingly, U.S. courts (but not
executive or legislative authorities) have frequently applied Article III. See, e.g., Monegasque
De Reassurances S.A.M. v. Nak Naftogaz, 311 F.3d 488 (2d Cir. 2002); Fotochrome, Inc. v.
Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 517–18 (2d Cir. 1975) (“The conclusion that we must enforce the
award as a valid determination on the merits is mandated by the United Nations Convention,
which provides in Article III . . .”); NTT DoCoMo, Inc. v. Ultra d.o.o., No. Civ.
3823(RMB)(JFC), 2010 WL 4159459, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2010).
323.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. IV. Again, unsurprisingly, Article IV has
been applied by U.S. courts (but not legislative or executive authorities). See, e.g., Czarina,
L.L.C. v. W.F. Poe Syndicate, 358 F.3d 1286, 1292 (11th Cir. 2004); China Minmetals
Materials Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Chi Mei Corp., 334 F.3d 274, 286 (3d Cir. 2003); Karaha Bodas
Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara, 335 F.3d 357, 368 (5th Cir.
2003).
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324

recognition of an award. Article VI is likewise directed to “competent
325
authorit[ies]” and “authorit[ies],” which are permitted to “adjourn” their
“decision on the enforcement of [an] award” and “order [a] party to give
326
suitable security.” All of these references to “competent authorities” are
again plainly to national courts and not to the executive or legislative
branches.
Thus, as with Article II, Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the Convention
are not only mandatory, but are also specifically directed to national courts,
addressing classic judicial functions of “recognizing and enforcing” awards,
applying “rules of procedure,” and deciding “applications.” These are
hallmarks of self-executing treaties, pointing decisively toward treating
Articles III, IV, V, and VI as self-executing.
Moreover, the text of the Convention’s provisions dealing with awards
is complete and comprehensive. No additional provisions are required
beyond those of Articles III, IV, V, and VI for the effective recognition and
enforcement of foreign awards. This is evident from the text of
contemporary national arbitration statutes that repeat Articles III, IV, V, and
VI verbatim. Articles 35 and 36 of the UNCITRAL Model Law are
327
328
representative examples, but other arbitration statutes are comparable.
In each case, arbitration statutes merely repeat the text of the Convention’s
329
provisions regarding recognition and enforcement of awards. As with
Article II, these textual aspects of Articles III, IV, V, and VI argue strongly
for the self-executing status of these provisions.

324.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. V, ¶ 1 (“Recognition and enforcement of
the award may be refused . . . only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the
recognition and enforcement is sought . . . . “), id. art. V, ¶ 1(e) (“The award . . . has been set
aside or suspended by a competent authority . . . “), id. art. V., ¶ 2 (“Recognition and
enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority . . . finds
that . . .”) (emphases added).
325.
“Competent authorities” clearly refers to national courts, although it might also
conceivably include other types of tribunals in some legal systems. In the U.S. legal system,
however, it is very difficult to conceive what the term “competent authority” would refer to in
addition to national courts. See BORN, supra note 1, § 26.01, at 3395 n.4 (“The term
‘competent authority’ refers in particular to national courts.”); see also Drahozal, Convention,
supra note 14, at 113.
326.
New York Convention, supra note 13, art. VI (“If an application for the setting
aside or suspension of the award has been made to a competent authority . . . the authority
before which the award is sought to be relied upon may, if it considers it proper, adjourn the
decision on the enforcement of the award . . . .”).
327.
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, supra note 134, arts. 35–36.
328.
See, e.g., The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 §§ 101–103 (Eng.); Arbitration
Ordinance, (2013) Cap. 609, 33–34, ¶¶ 87–89 (H.K.); Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996,
No. 26 of 1996, INDIA CODE (1996) §§ 46–48; Arbitration Act 2002, c. 10, §§ 29–31 (Sing.).
329.
A few national arbitration statutes go further and either incorporate the
Convention’s provisions regarding arbitral awards by reference or provide for recognition and
enforcement of awards in accordance with the Convention. See SR 291.435.1 (1987), art. 194
(Switz.); The Arbitration Act 1996, c. 23 §§ 100–103 (Eng.).
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2. Purposes of Articles III, IV, V, and VI
The purposes of the Convention also argue for treating Articles III, IV,
V, and VI as self-executing. As discussed above, the Convention’s goals of
uniform treatment of foreign and non-domestic arbitral awards are best
330
fulfilled by treating Articles III, IV, V, and VI as self-executing. Doing so
reduces the risks of divergent national legislative and judicial application of
331
the Convention, both by legislative and judicial action. Consistent with
this, a decisive majority of Contracting States to the Convention regard its
provisions—including Articles III, IV, V, and VI—as directly applicable in
332
national courts.

3. U.S. Ratification of the New York Convention
The history of U.S. ratification of the Convention and enactment of
Chapter 2 of the FAA confirm the self-executing status of Articles III, IV,
V, and VI. As with Article II of the Convention, this ratification history
reflects an understanding that the Convention would override state law,
thereby ensuring that the United States would comply with its obligations
under the Convention to recognize and enforce foreign awards.
Preliminarily, Section 201 of the FAA confirms that the Convention is
self-executing, providing that “the Convention . . . shall be enforced” in U.S.
courts “in accordance with this chapter,” a prescription which rests on the
premise that the Convention is self-executing and that it is therefore the
333
Convention itself that applies in U.S. federal courts. Section 207 adopts
the same approach for the recognition of awards. As discussed above,
Section 207 provides that, “[w]ithin three years after an arbitral award
falling under the Convention is made, any party to the arbitration may
apply” to a U.S. federal court for confirmation of the award and that the
court “shall confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal
or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the
334
Convention.” This text reflects Chapter 2’s basic approach of providing
ancillary provisions for application of the Convention’s self-executing terms
in U.S. federal courts, all on the express premise (reflected in the text of §§
335
201, 207, and 208 ) that the Convention’s terms are self-executing and
336
themselves applicable in U.S. courts.
330.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
331.
See id.
332.
See, e.g., Cass., 8 ottobre 2008, n. 24856, 34 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 644, 647 (It.);
S.T.S., Jan. 14, 1983, (11 Y.B. COMM. ARB., p. 523) (Spain); App. Milano, 3 maggio 1997, 4
Y.B. COMM. ARB. 284, 285 (It.). See supra pp. 64–65.
333.
9 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (emphasis added).
334.
Id. § 207.
335.
See supra pp. 36–37.
336.
This is confirmed by the absence of any reference in § 207 (or otherwise in Chapter
2) to Articles IV and VI of the Convention, dealing with very significant issues of proof of the
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Moreover, Section 207 plainly applies only to the recognition of awards
337
in federal courts. At the same time, the Supreme Court had not held in
1970, when the Convention was ratified—and still has not held—that
338
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA apply in state courts. By their terms, those
sections apply only to “courts of the United States,” making arguments that
339
their provisions have preemptive effects in state courts difficult. State
courts are divided on the question whether Section 9 or Section 10 of the
FAA apply in state court; several such courts have held that they do not and
that state law governs the vacatur and confirmation of awards in state
340
courts.
Thus, if the Convention is non-self-executing, the recognition of foreign
awards in state courts would be subject only to state law in a number of
states, a result that very likely would have been assumed in 1970 (prior to
341
Southland v. Keating). Critically, however, state law regarding the
recognition of awards in 1970 diverged in a number of states very
significantly from the mandatory requirements of Articles III, IV, V, and VI
342
of the Convention. Substantial differences continue to exist between state

arbitral award and suspension of recognition proceedings. Compare New York Convention,
arts. IV, VI, with 9 U.S.C. § 207. Just as Chapter 2 omits any provision providing for
application of the substantive terms of Article II of the Convention, it also omits such
provisions for Articles IV and VI.
337.
See supra pp. 39–43.
338.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04(B)(1)(e)(iv), at 160–65; Drahozal, Convention,
supra note 14, at 109; RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV.
ARBITRATION § 1-2 reporters’ note a(ii) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018).
339.
See supra pp. 39–43.
340.
Currently, some states apply the FAA § 10 vacatur grounds, while other states
apply state law. Compare U.S. Elecs., Inc. v. Sirius Satellite Radio, Inc., 958 N.E.2d 891, 892
(N.Y. 2011) (“As this matter affects interstate commerce, the vacatur of the arbitration award
is governed by the Federal Arbitration Act.”), Vold v. Broin Assocs., 699 N.W.2d 482, 487
(S.D. 2005), Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861, 865 (Idaho 1980), Hilton
Constr. Co. v. Martin Mech. Contractors, Inc., 308 S.E.2d 830, 832 (Ga. 1983), Dowd v. First
Omaha Secs. Corp., 495 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Neb. 1993), Hereford v. D.R. Horton, Inc., 13 So. 3d
375, 379 (Ala. 2009), and A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Petrucci, 525 So. 2d 918, 921 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988), with Commonwealth ex rel. Kane v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 114 A.3d
37, 56–57 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2015) (vacating award under state vacatur standards; construed to
be identical to FAA vacatur standards), State v. Philip Morris, Inc., 123 A.3d 660, 675 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2015) (same), and Trombetta v. Raymond James Fin. Servs., 907 A.2d 550,
569–76 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2006) (state law vacatur grounds not preempted by FAA; court still
refused to apply de novo review provision). Many states have not addressed the issue. Cf.
Gary B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: COMMENTARY AND
MATERIALS (2d ed. 2001), § 13(A)(2)(f), at 892 (maintaining that the more appropriate
interpretation is that sections 9 and 10, like section 2, apply in state courts).
341.
See supra pp. 43–44.
342.
See Quigley, Accession by the United States, supra note 62, at 1057 (“In the United
States, no state arbitration statute makes any provision for the enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards; therefore, there is no summary procedure to confirm an interstate or foreign award in
the state courts.”) (footnote omitted); Aksen, American Arbitration Accession, supra note 23,
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law and the Convention today. Moreover, even if one were to assume that
all of Chapter 1 of the domestic FAA, including Sections 9 and 10, applied
in state courts to awards involving U.S. foreign commerce, there are
significant differences between the standards applicable to awards under
Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA and Articles III, IV, V, and VI of the
344
Convention. And, as discussed above, state law would continue to apply
to awards that are subject to the Convention but not within U.S. foreign
345
commerce under Section 1 of the domestic FAA.
Because of the foregoing, if the Convention were non-self-executing,
the political branches would have, in ratifying it, been placing the United
States into either very serious breach (if state law applied to awards in state
courts) or serious breach (if Sections 9 and 10 of the FAA applied in state
courts). As with Article II of the Convention, it is difficult to imagine that
346
this is what the federal political branches intended, particularly given the
347
Convention’s objectives of uniformity.
Instead, the better and more straightforward conclusion is that the
federal political branches understood that the Convention was selfexecuting, with Chapter 2 only providing ancillary mechanisms for
application of the Convention in federal courts. Consistent with this, there is
no suggestion in either the Convention’s ratification process in the United
States or the legislative history of Chapter 2 that Articles III, IV, V, and VI
348
are non-self-executing. On the contrary, and again for the same reasons as
at 10 (“[T]he only state with a modern arbitration statute that provides for the enforcement of
foreign awards is Florida.”).
343.
See BORN, supra note 1, § 1.04(B)(1)(e)(iv), at 164.
344.
Among other things, the differences between the Convention and the domestic
FAA include: (a) the grounds for denying recognition of awards (with Articles III, IV and V
of the Convention prescribing limited grounds for non-recognition that differ materially from
those in § 10 of Chapter 1); (b) the existence of a requirement that parties agree in their
arbitration agreement that the award shall be confirmed by court order (which is imposed by §
9 of Chapter 1 of the FAA but not by the Convention); (c) the requirements for proof of the
existence of a foreign award (imposed by Article IV of the Convention but not by Chapter 1
of the FAA); and (d) differences in jurisdictional requirements, reciprocity reservations, nonarbitrability exceptions, and federal policies favoring arbitration.
345.
See supra pp. 50–51.
346.
Finally, if the Convention were non-self-executing, there would also be uncertainty
regarding its application in federal courts. It is unclear what provisions of Chapter 2 of the
FAA would implement Articles II, III, IV and VI of the Convention. Section 207 of Chapter 2
provides for implementation of Article V’s exceptions to the recognition of awards. See supra
p. 74. Nothing in Chapter 2 appears, however, to provide for similar implementation of
Article II’s provisions for recognition of arbitration agreements or of Articles III, IV and VI
with respect to awards. Arguably, § 201’s general provision that the Convention shall be
enforced in accordance with Chapter 2 of the FAA provides for the application of the
substantive terms of Articles II, III, IV and VI, but, as discussed above, this is difficult to
reconcile with § 207’s specific implementation of Article V’s exceptions or with the text of §
201 (which is not readily interpreted as incorporating the Convention’s terms). See id.
347.
See supra Parts I.A–B.
348.
See supra Part II.B.3.

180

Michigan Journal of International Law

[Vol. 40:115

detailed above in the context of Article II, the ratification history of the
Convention in the United States provides strong evidence that all of the
Convention—including Articles III, IV, V, and VI—was regarded as self349
executing.

* * * * * *
A concluding observation about the current draft of the Restatement of
the U.S. Law of International Commercial and Investment Arbitration is
necessary. The American Law Institute describes a Restatement’s objective
as “explicat[ing] what the law is, or should be, in the area addressed” in
350
order to “promote the clarification and simplification of the law.” Despite
that objective, the Restatement takes no position on the self-executing status
of the Convention, instead only commenting that the issue is
351
“unresolved,” although also opining that, “[u]nder the requirements set
forth in Medellín v. Texas . . . the Convention would have difficulty meeting
352
the criteria of a self-executing treaty.”
The Restatement’s failure to resolve the Convention’s status beyond its
general expression of doubt is surprising: as detailed above, the text of the
Convention, its ratification history, and other factors argue decisively that
353
the Convention’s provisions are self-executing.
The Restatement
unhesitatingly states U.S. law on other topics, often in the absence of
354
Supreme Court or other clear authority, and it is anomalous that the
Restatement does not do so with respect to the Convention’s status.
The Restatement’s silence is particularly surprising—and also
unfortunate—because of the foundational character of the Convention’s
status. Unless one answers the question whether the Convention is selfexecuting, it is impossible to go on to “restate” the law governing
international arbitration in American courts in a principled manner. The
uncertain and unsatisfying results of leaving this foundational issue
unresolved, set forth in Appendix A, again illustrate this point. At a
minimum, the Restatement’s approach is a missed opportunity to assist in

349.
See id.
350.
The American Law Institute describes its objectives in AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING
THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK FOR ALI REPORTERS AND
THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK 1–2 (2015).
351.
RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-2
reporters’ note a(iv) (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018); id. § 1-5 reporters’ note
b(iv) (“[B]ecause it is not necessary for this Restatement to take a position on whether the
New York Convention is self-executing, it does not do so.”).
352.
Id. § 1-5 reporters’ note b(iv); see also supra pp. 48–49.
353.
See supra Parts II.B–C.
354.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT OF U.S. LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV.
ARBITRATION § 1-5 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 6, 2018) (providing annulment
standards for non-domestic awards made in the United States).
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clarification of a critical aspect of the law governing international arbitration
in American courts.
The Restatement attempts to remedy its silence regarding the
Convention’s status by fashioning a set of substantive rules governing
arbitration agreements and awards, which are assertedly applicable in both
federal and state courts, even if the Convention were non-self-executing.
The Restatement creates two constructs separately addressing arbitration
agreements and arbitral awards.
First, the Restatement asserts that the domestic FAA prescribes
“essentially equivalent” standards to those of Article II of the Convention,
proceeding on the basis that the Convention’s status is irrelevant insofar as
355
the recognition of international arbitration agreements is concerned. The
Restatement then goes on to base its substantive rules governing arbitration
agreements, applicable identically in both U.S. state and federal courts, in
356
significant part on Section 2 of the domestic FAA.
Second, the
Restatement postulates that Section 207 of the FAA is applicable in state
357
courts, thus assertedly providing a statutory as opposed to a treaty basis
for the recognition of awards pursuant to the Convention’s standards in state
courts; this enables the Restatement to proceed on the basis that the grounds
for recognition of foreign and non-domestic awards in both state and federal
358
courts are those prescribed by the Convention.
Putting aside their unfortunate failure to confirm the Convention’s selfexecuting status, both of the Restatement’s positions are very difficult to
accept as plausible statutory interpretations of the FAA. Both positions are
also bad policy: they aggravate the problems resulting from failure to
resolve the Convention’s self-executing status, would place the United
States out of step with other Contracting States to the Convention, and miss
an opportunity to enhance the Convention’s efficacy.
First, the Restatement’s approach to international arbitration agreements
is inconsistent with existing U.S. authority. The Restatement’s suggestion
that the domestic standards of Section 2 of the FAA are “essentially
equivalent” to the international standards of the Convention is surprising,
because it presumes that a domestic U.S. statute, enacted in 1925, produces
“essentially” the same rules as an international instrument negotiated with
limited U.S. participation in 1958. Even apart from that inherent
355.
Id. § 1-2 reporters’ note a(iv) (“[W]hether Article II(3) of the New York
Convention is self-executing does not affect the scope of FAA preemption because as
construed in the Restatement . . . the Article II defenses to enforcement of international
arbitration agreements are essentially equivalent (subject to differences in the applicable law)
to the defenses applicable under the savings clause of FAA § 2.”).
356.
Id. § 1-2 reporters’ notes b(i), (ii); id. §§ 2-12 to 2-20 (citing, interchangeably, U.S.
decisions under Chapter 1 of the FAA and decisions under the Convention).
357.
Id. § 1-5, cmt. b (“FAA § 207 thus applies to both federal courts and state courts,
and makes the grounds in Article V of the New York Convention applicable in both federal
court and state court.”).
358.
Id. § 1-5, cmts. a, b.
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implausibility, the suggestion of “essential equivalence” is incorrect because
it ignores multiple, substantial differences between the Convention and the
domestic FAA, which, as discussed above, have been applied consistently
359
by U.S. courts. Relatedly, the Restatement’s suggestion also rests on the
faulty presumption that Section 2 of the FAA applies to all arbitration
agreements and awards that are subject to the Convention. As discussed
above, that is incorrect because the jurisdictional scope of Section 1 of the
FAA is significantly more limited than that of the Convention, thus leaving
substantial numbers of international arbitration agreements and awards
subject only to state law—and not the federal standards of Section 2 of the
360
FAA—in state (and possibly federal) courts.
More fundamentally, the Restatement’s approach should not be what
U.S. law provides: the Restatement substitutes domestic U.S. standards—or,
more accurately, a sui generis amalgamation of domestic and international
standards—in place of the terms of the Convention in a manner that
361
contradicts the treaty’s basic objectives. That approach would require
ignoring the separate text and purposes of both the domestic FAA,
applicable under Chapter 1 to domestic arbitration agreements, and the
Convention, applicable under Chapter 2 and the Convention itself to
international arbitration agreements, instead amalgamating two separate
instruments into a new corpus of general arbitration law. Neither the
Convention nor the FAA provide for, or should provide for, such an
approach. The better approach is that which courts in other countries have
362
363
adopted, which the UNCITRAL Model Law prescribes and U.S. state

359.
See supra pp. 47–50. Relatedly, the Restatement also ignores, and contradicts, the
largely unanimous body of U.S. authority that applies different standards to international
arbitration agreements, subject to the Convention, than to domestic arbitration agreements,
subject to Chapter 1. See supra pp. 48–49.
360.
See supra pp. 51–52.
361.
See supra Parts I-A–B.
362.
See, e.g., Milano Trib., 8 gennaio 1990, 17 Y.B. COMM. ARB. 539, 539–40 (It.)
(“[The arbitration] clause . . . meets the requirement of Art. II of the [Convention] . . . . The
further requirement of a specific approval of the clause in writing, provided for in Art. 1341
CC: is not necessary for the arbitration clause to be valid. According to Art. 26 of the
Preliminary Provisions to the CC; the clause is regulated by Italian law only as far as the
Italian law is not derogated from by the said international Convention, which does not provide
for such a specific approval.”) (footnotes omitted); Bharat Aluminium Co. v. Kaiser
Aluminium Tech. Serv., Inc., (2012) 9 SCC 552, ¶ 149 (India) (“The underlying motivation of
the New York Convention was to reduce the hurdles and produce a uniform, simple and
speedy system for enforcement of foreign arbitral award. Therefore, it seems to be accepted
by the commentators and the courts in different jurisdictions that the language of Article
V(1)(e) referring to the “second alternative” is to the country applying the procedural law of
arbitration if different from the arbitral forum and not the substantive law governing the
underlying contract between the parties.”).
363.
See UNCITRAL MODEL LAW, art. 2A(1); see also BORN, supra note 1, §
1.04(A)(1)(e), at 117.
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364

courts have held the Convention requires:
international arbitration
agreements are governed by the mandatory international terms of the
Convention, regardless of what rules and policies apply to domestic
agreements under Chapter 1 of the domestic FAA.
Second, the Restatement’s approach to the recognition of arbitral
awards is also flawed. Contrary to the Restatement’s suggestions, Section
207 of the FAA is applicable only in U.S. federal, not U.S. state, courts;
there is no tenable way to interpret Chapter 2 of the FAA to reach the
365
Restatement’s apparent conclusion. As a result, if the Convention were
non-self-executing, the standards applicable to the recognition of foreign
and non-domestic awards would differ materially between federal and state
courts. Among other things, as discussed above, Article IV’s standards of
proof of awards and Article V’s narrow and exclusive grounds for nonrecognition of awards would not apply in U.S. state courts. Instead,
materially more demanding standards of proof and more expansive and nonexclusive grounds for non-recognition would apply in state courts, with
366
different standards likely applicable in each of the several states.
These results, which the Restatement’s approach would produce, are
both unsatisfactory and implausible. They are unsatisfactory because the
existence of two—or fifty-one—materially different legal regimes for the
recognition of international arbitral awards in American courts contradicts
the basic objectives of both the Convention and the Supremacy Clause. That
is particularly true where a number of those legal regimes (in those states
with archaic arbitration legislation) are plainly contrary to U.S.
commitments under the Convention. For the same reasons, these results are
also implausible. Both the Charming Betsy presumption and the federal
political branches’ stated intention to faithfully implement the Convention
underscore that conclusion.

364.
See supra notes 233–35.
365.
The Restatement asserts: “Section 207 applies to ‘any court having jurisdiction
under’ FAA Chapter 2, which includes but is not limited to federal courts . . . FAA § 207 thus
applies to both federal courts and state courts, and makes the grounds in Article V of the New
York Convention applicable in both federal court and state court.” RESTATEMENT OF U.S.
LAW OF INT’L COMMERCIAL & INV. ARBITRATION § 1-5 cmt. B (AM. LAW INST., Tentative
Draft No. 6, 2018). The Restatement’s assertion that “any court having jurisdiction under this
chapter” includes state courts is wrong. Sections 202 and 203 provide grants of federal subject
matter jurisdiction to “the district courts of the United States,” not to state courts. 9 U.S.C. §
203 (2012). Nothing in Chapter 2 grants state courts jurisdiction over actions arising under the
Convention. Likewise, the Restatement’s interpretation of § 207 would also mean that § 206
(regarding appointment of arbitrators and orders compelling arbitration) applies in state courts
(which plainly was not intended). There is also no indication in Chapter 2’s legislative history
that any such results were intended, with the Executive Branch instead repeatedly testifying
that Chapter 2 would not “have any effect whatever on state laws” and that the chapter
“concerns in effect solely the jurisdiction of the Federal district courts.” 1970 Kearney
Statement, supra note 175, at 10 (emphasis added).
366.
See supra note 245.
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In sum, the Restatement’s current architecture of U.S. arbitration law
rests on flawed foundations and produces unsatisfactory results. Instead of
leaving the Convention’s status unresolved, the Restatement should have
taken the opportunity to resolve that fundamental question and then to
provide a restatement of the international rules that apply to international
arbitration agreements and awards. In doing so, the Restatement could have
contributed to the ongoing process—in which U.S. courts historically have
played a central role—of interpreting the Convention and providing a robust
international legal framework for international arbitration.

Conclusion
The New York Convention is the world’s most successful private
international law treaty. The Convention provides the framework for
resolution of a substantial proportion of all international commercial
disputes over the past half century and the foundation for greatly-expanded
international trade and investment. Central to the Convention’s success is
the prescription of uniform international rules governing the recognition of
367
international arbitration agreements and awards.
Only limited attention has been devoted to the question whether the
Convention is self-executing in the United States. Nonetheless, this issue is
of considerable importance to the continued success of the Convention, both
in the United States and elsewhere. In the United States, it is critical that the
Convention be regarded as self-executing, as most U.S. courts have held or
assumed. As discussed above, unless the Convention is self-executing,
nothing in the FAA (or otherwise) makes its terms applicable in state
courts—an unsatisfactory result that would place the United States in
material breach of its international obligations—while important provisions
of the Convention would arguably not apply in U.S. federal courts.
Moreover, the Convention’s status as a self-executing treaty plays a
highly important role in ensuring that the Convention’s objective of
prescribing uniform and harmonized international rules governing the
recognition of international arbitration agreements and awards is achieved.
If the Convention itself is not applicable in national courts, and instead is
only mediated through individual and divergent national or state laws, then
the essential objectives of uniformity and harmonization are inevitably
frustrated. That is graphically illustrated by the treatment of the
Convention’s terms in the Restatement of the U.S. Law of International
Commercial and Investment Arbitration, which provides that the
Convention is implemented in U.S. state courts through a sui generis
combination of Section 2 of the domestic FAA and Section 207 of Chapter
2 of the FAA, and which would result in the application of substantive rules
differing materially from those applicable under the Convention.

367.

See supra Parts I.A–B.
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The uniform interpretation of the Convention is particularly important
because the Convention does not contain any mechanism for resolving
disputes over its interpretation and instead depends on the interpretations of
national courts. In order for the Convention to be interpreted and developed
in a uniform manner, it is important that the Convention’s terms, and not the
provisions of divergent municipal arbitration statutes, be applied. Treating
the Convention as non-self-executing would threaten to balkanize its terms,
with courts and legislatures in different Contracting States adopting
inconsistent applications of the language of individual implementing
statutes and, inevitably, divergent understandings of the meaning of the
Convention itself. It is important to the Convention’s continued role in
providing an effective legal framework for international arbitration that the
Convention be treated as self-executing, with U.S. and other national courts
interpreting the same text and not divergent national statutory enactments.
Despite the uncertainty of some authorities, the text, purposes, and
history of the Convention all argue decisively for treating both Article II of
the Convention—dealing with international arbitration agreements—and
Articles III, IV, V, and VI—addressing awards—as self-executing. That
conclusion is confirmed by the interpretations of the Convention that
national courts and other authorities have adopted, as well as by the terms of
national arbitration legislation in Contracting States other than the United
States. The Convention’s self-executing status ensures that the Convention
will be fully applicable in American courts, both state and federal, and that
the Convention’s objective of uniformity can be fulfilled, providing the
basis for national courts to work together in applying the Convention and
developing the international rules that it prescribes. This collaborative role
of national courts, implementing the Convention’s international terms, has
been an important element of the Convention’s success over the past sixty
years and is equally important to its success in coming decades.
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Appendix A
Federal Courts
Arbitration
Arbitral
Agreements
Awards

State Courts
Arbitration
Agreements

Arbitral
Awards

Convention Self-Executing

Convention Non-Self-Executing
x §201 Incorporates
Convention for Federal
Courts
x §2 Preempts in State Courts
for Agreements Involving
“Foreign Commerce”; § 207
Incorporated for Awards in
State Courts
x §201 Incorporates
Convention for Federal
Courts
x §§2, 9, and 10 Preempt in
State Courts for Agreements
and Awards Involving
“Foreign Commerce”
x § 201 Incorporates
Convention for Federal
Courts
x §2 Preempts in State Courts
for Agreements in “Foreign
Commerce”; No
Incorporation or Preemption
for Awards in State Courts
x §§2, 3, and 4 Apply to
Agreements in Federal Courts
for “Foreign Commerce”
x §207 Incorporates
Convention, Arts. III, IV, and
V in Federal Courts
x §2 Preempts in State Courts
for Agreements in “Foreign
Commerce”; No
Incorporation or Preemption
for Awards in State Courts
x §§2, 3, and 4 Apply to
Agreements in Federal Courts
for “Foreign Commerce”

NYC
Art. II

NYC
Arts. III,
IV, V and
VI

NYC Art. II

NYC
Arts. III,
IV, V
and VI

NYC
Art. II

NYC
Arts. III,
IV, V and
VI

§2 (not
§§3,4)

§207;
NYC
Arts. III,
IV, and
V

State law*

NYC
Art. II

NYC
Art. II

NYC
Arts. III,
IV, V and
VI

NYC
Arts. III,
IV, V and
VI

§2 (not
§§3,4)

§§9 and
10

State law*

State
law*

§2 (not
§§3,4)
State
Law
State law*

§2 (not
§§3,4)

§§2, 3, 4
§207;
NYC
Arts. III,
IV and V
State law*

§§2, 3, 4

State
Law
State law*

§207;
NYC
Arts. III,

State Law

State
Law
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x §207 Incorporates
Convention, Arts. III, IV, and
V in Federal Courts
x No Incorporation or
Preemption for Agreements
or Awards in State Courts
x §§2, 3, and 4 Apply to
Agreements in Federal Courts
for “Foreign Commerce”
x §§9 and 10 Apply to Awards
in Federal Courts for “Foreign
Commerce”
x No Incorporation or
Preemption for Agreements
or Awards in State Courts
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IV and V
State law*

§§2, 3, 4

§§9 and
10
State Law

State law*

State
Law

State law*

* State law for agreements/awards not involving the “foreign commerce” of the United
States

